

The Impact of Separation of Powers on Foreign Policy Stability and International Credibility: A Comparative Analysis of Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes

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ABSTRACT: This study examines, from an interdisciplinary perspective, the impact of the separation of powers on states' foreign policy processes and their position in international relations. Systematized by Montesquieu, this principle constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of democratic governance by ensuring a balanced distribution of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Rather than treating the principle solely as a matter of constitutional law, the study evaluates it within the framework of comparative foreign policy analysis and international relations theory. By bringing together democratic peace theory, liberal institutionalism, and structural realism, it addresses the multidimensional role of the separation of powers within a holistic framework. Adopting a comparative method, the research examines established democracies such as the United States, Germany, and France alongside states with different forms of government such as Türkiye, China, and Russia through qualitative analysis, document examination, and case studies. The findings show that where the separation of powers operates robustly, foreign policy is conducted more consistently, predictably, and transparently. In these states, legislative oversight and judicial independence anchor foreign policy decisions within a legal framework, strengthening compliance with international law, adherence to agreements, and diplomatic credibility. This outcome rests on the fact that subjecting foreign policy decisions to multi-institutional approval and to scrutiny makes the commitments given more binding and more credible. Conversely, in authoritarian and hybrid regimes where the principle is weak, decisions are taken by a narrow circle, generating unpredictability and distrust in the international arena. The study further shows that states grounded in the separation of powers assume more constructive roles in international organizations, manage crises more successfully, contribute more effectively to global governance, and, through the rule of law, offer a stable environment for investors. The separation of powers thus emerges as a structural variable shaping not only domestic governance but also states' effectiveness, credibility, and legitimacy in the international system.

KEYWORDS: Separation of powers, foreign policy, international credibility, democratic peace theory, judicial independence.

1. INTRODUCTION

The principle of the separation of powers, as one of the indispensable elements of modern democratic systems, envisages a balanced distribution of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state. The principle aims to limit state authority and to protect individual rights and freedoms (Montesquieu, 1748). In this respect, the separation of powers is regarded as one of the foundational building blocks that secure the legitimacy of the state, and it functions as an institutional safeguard against the abuse of state power (Vile, 1998). With historical roots reaching back to Ancient Greece, the concept acquired a systematic framework largely through the work of the Enlightenment thinker Montesquieu and came to constitute the foundation of modern democratic structures (Özbudun, 2018). The principle that Montesquieu set out in *De l'Esprit des Lois* (The Spirit of the Laws) was not merely a proposal in political philosophy but also became a decisive reference point in the institutionalization of constitutional democracies (Ackerman, 2000). By preventing the concentration of power in a single hand in democratic governments, the separation of powers forestalls the emergence of despotic tendencies and thereby contributes to the formation of a pluralistic and participatory social structure (Erdoğan, 2020). Indeed, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) stress that democratic erosion typically begins with the weakening of separation-of-powers mechanisms and that the executive's acquisition of excessive power over the other branches triggers authoritarian tendencies.

The separation of powers not only shapes domestic politics but also significantly influences states' foreign policy decisions and their position within the international system (Keohane & Nye, 2001). The foreign policy dimension of this principle has attracted increasing scholarly attention, particularly with the rise of democratic peace theory in the post-Cold War period, and the question of how states' internal governance structures shape their international behavior has moved to the center of comparative foreign policy analysis (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Legislative and judicial oversight of the executive makes possible a more comprehensive assessment of foreign policy decisions and the formulation of long-term strategies (Gözler, 2017). In this context, Fearon (1994) argues that democratic states, owing to domestic audience costs, possess a stronger incentive to honor their international commitments, since separation-of-powers mechanisms make it politically costly for the executive to renege on its promises. Accordingly, in systems where the separation of powers is strong, positive effects such as foreign policy consistency, compliance with international law, and credibility in diplomatic relations are observed (Donnelly, 2013). From a similar perspective, Simmons (2009) demonstrates with empirical evidence that independent judicial bodies and legislative oversight play a decisive role in the domestic incorporation of international human rights norms.

Assessed from the perspective of international relations, states possessing a separation-of-powers system are regarded as more predictable and stable actors in the global arena (Fukuyama, 2014). This predictability makes it easier for other states to find a reliable basis for cooperation when formulating their own foreign policy strategies and contributes to the sustainability of the rules-based international order (Martin, A., 2020). The functioning of democratic mechanisms increases these states' adherence to international agreements and fosters an atmosphere of trust in diplomatic relations (Moravcsik, 1997). In systems where the separation of powers is weak, by contrast, foreign policy decisions often remain dependent on the personal preferences of the leader, and this can generate uncertainty and distrust in international relations (Mearsheimer, 2001). Svoboda (2012) shows that the shaping of foreign policy decision-making by a narrow circle of elites in authoritarian regimes increases the risk of strategic error and that these regimes' levels of commitment to their international obligations remain structurally low.

In today's international system, the relationship between states' internal governance structures and their foreign policy behavior is gaining ever greater importance. In this context, the separation of powers emerges as a critical element for the sound functioning of democratic governments (Habermas, 1996). According to Freedom House (2023) data, in countries where the trend of democratic backsliding has accelerated globally and where separation-of-powers mechanisms have been weakened, both domestic instability and foreign policy unpredictability have increased; this clearly demonstrates the academic and political topicality of the subject. The mutual balancing and oversight of state organs prevents arbitrariness and authoritarian tendencies in governance, thereby ensuring the rule of law and the protection of individual rights (Vile, 1998). This both enhances stability and legitimacy in domestic politics and brings with it perception as a credible actor in the international arena. Assessed within the framework of Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory, the institutional balancing mechanisms of domestic politics offer states both constraints and opportunities in international negotiation processes; this confirms that the separation of powers is a variable directly shaping the interaction between domestic and foreign policy.

In governments where the separation-of-powers system is absent or rendered dysfunctional, the executive's pressure on the other branches increases, and this leads to the erosion of democratic structures (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Scheppele (2018) explains this process through the concept of "autocratic legalism," arguing that the executive's use of legal instruments to render the separation of powers effectively inoperative constitutes one of the most widespread forms of democratic backsliding today. Especially in areas such as foreign policy, where national interests are directly affected, decisions taken by a single authority often reflect short-term and populist approaches rather than long-term strategies (Çınar, 2019). For this reason, examining the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes is of great importance for understanding the international effectiveness of democratic systems. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) show that, especially in countries undergoing democratic transition, the fact that institutional balances have not yet settled can increase the risk of aggressiveness in foreign policy, thereby empirically supporting the decisive role of separation-of-powers mechanisms in foreign policy stability.

Furthermore, the increase in interdependence in international relations under the influence of globalization has made the repercussions of countries' internal governance structures on their foreign policies more visible (Nye, 2004). In this environment of growing interdependence, states' levels of participation in international trade agreements, multilateral security pacts, and global governance mechanisms have become largely related to the soundness of their internal institutional structures (Büthe & Milner, 2008). In this context, the effects of the separation of powers on countries' compliance with international law, their credibility in diplomatic relations, and their approach to global problems are attracting increasing attention in the academic literature (Keohane, 2005). In particular, the necessity of international cooperation in resolving transboundary problems such as climate

change, migration, terrorism, and pandemics brings the foreign policy dimension of democratic accountability mechanisms and of the separation of powers further to the fore (Kahler, 2016).

This study, while examining the role of the separation-of-powers system in democratic governments, aims to analyze how this system affects a country's position in the international arena. In line with this aim, the study, rather than treating the separation of powers as a purely constitutional-law matter, evaluates it through an interdisciplinary approach within the framework of comparative foreign policy analysis and international relations theories. It aims in particular to offer a comprehensive analysis around such critical issues as the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy decision-making, its contribution to the elements of accountability and credibility in international relations, how it shapes mechanisms of compliance with international law, and the policies that great powers pursue toward governments that adopt or reject the principle of the separation of powers. This analysis also aims to set out the functionality of democratic institutions in foreign policy processes comparatively against foreign policy-making processes in authoritarian and hybrid regimes, and to render concrete the effect of the separation of powers on international credibility and diplomatic effectiveness (Owen, 2019).

Within the scope of the research, the hypothesis that foreign policy is more consistent and predictable in democratic systems with a strong separation of powers will be tested, and it will be examined whether adherence to international law and to rules-based systems is higher in these systems. At the same time, how foreign policy processes are shaped in systems where the separation of powers is weak, and the repercussions of this for the international system, will also be examined. Within this framework, the study aims to assess the role of the separation of powers in international relations on a multidimensional theoretical foundation, drawing on Doyle's (1986) democratic peace theory, Keohane's (1984) liberal institutionalist approach, and Waltz's (1979) structural realism perspective.

Another aim of the study is to assess the contribution of the separation of powers to global governance mechanisms. The role of democratic systems and of the separation of powers in areas such as international organizations, multilateral agreements, and the struggle against global problems will be addressed in detail. In this context, the effectiveness and leadership of countries committed to democratic values in global cooperation processes will be examined. Pevehouse (2005), in examining the contribution of international regional organizations to democratization processes, found that states possessing a separation of powers assume more active and constructive roles in these organizations, a finding that supports one of the study's basic assumptions.

This research, by examining the national and international aspects of the separation-of-powers system, analyzes in particular the effects of this principle on foreign policy in democratic regimes. By combining theoretical and empirical dimensions, the study evaluates the links between the separation of powers and foreign policy within the framework of the academic literature. This evaluation is situated at the intersection of the disciplines of international relations, comparative politics, and constitutional law, and addresses the repercussions of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes from a holistic perspective. Within the scope of the inquiry, countries with different governance systems—such as Western European democracies, the United States, Türkiye, China, and Russia—are analyzed, and the contribution of the separation-of-powers mechanism to foreign policy-making processes is scrutinized. In selecting these countries, in line with Seawright and Gerring's (2008) case selection techniques, the principle of diversity—representing different political systems, geographical regions, and levels of development—was taken as the basis.

The research addresses the different dimensions of the separation of powers and comprehensively examines the effects of this principle on international relations, law, organizations, and foreign policy processes. The international repercussions of issues such as the formation of democratic institutions, the development of civil society, and the rule of law are also evaluated. The study likewise addresses the development of the separation of powers within its historical course and the role of this principle in democratic systems. This historical perspective makes it possible to trace the evolution of the separation of powers in the process extending from Montesquieu to Madison and onward to today's constitutional democracies, as well as the repercussions of this evolution for foreign policy practices (Gönenc, 2021).

In addition, the importance of the separation of powers within today's international system and its contribution to global governance structures are examined. Particularly in areas such as globalization, international law, and human rights, the role and contributions of countries committed to democratic values are analyzed in detail. In this context, the kind of role the separation of powers might play in shaping the future international system is also discussed. Weiss and Wilkinson (2014) emphasize that global governance structures have become increasingly complex and that, in managing this complexity, the accountability function of democratic institutions has acquired

strategic importance; this observation makes the examination of the international dimension of the separation of powers all the more necessary.

In today's international system, states' democratic structures and separation-of-powers mechanisms have become an important determining factor in foreign policy-making processes (Fukuyama, 2014). Especially the wave of democratic backsliding experienced on a global scale in the first quarter of the twenty-first century has made the question of how the erosion of separation-of-powers mechanisms affects foreign policy processes even more current and urgent (Levitsky & Way, 2020). At the same time, it is observed that governments lacking a separation of powers are more aggressive and unpredictable in foreign policy. Indeed, Geddes (2003) has shown with empirical evidence that the taking of foreign policy decisions by a narrow elite group in authoritarian regimes causes these decisions to remain unaccountable to public opinion and to lead to strategic inconsistencies. This study seeks an answer to the following central question:

How does the separation-of-powers system affect a country's credibility in the international arena and its foreign policy stability?

This central question rests on a broad research tradition in the discipline of international relations that examines the interaction between domestic and foreign policy, drawing on Putnam's (1988) two-level game model, Allison and Zelikow's (1999) bureaucratic politics approach, and Kaarbo's (2015) foreign policy analysis perspective.

In addition to this central question, the following sub-questions will be addressed:

- To what extent are the foreign policies of countries with a strong separation-of-powers system consistent?
- What kinds of risks arise in systems where the executive determines foreign policy on its own?
- Are countries with a separation-of-powers principle perceived as more credible actors in international relations?
- What kind of advantage or disadvantage does the separation of powers create in the foreign policies of great powers?
- How does the weakening of the separation of powers affect a country's position and effectiveness in the international arena?
- What is the effect of democratic oversight mechanisms on foreign policy decisions?
- What is the role of the separation of powers in international organizations and multilateral diplomacy processes?

These sub-questions make it possible to address the foreign policy dimension of the separation of powers at different levels of analysis—the state level, the level of bilateral relations, and the level of the international system—and allow the research to be conducted within a multilayered structure (Ripsman, 2009).

Within the framework of these questions, the role and importance of the separation of powers in states' international relations will be examined comprehensively, and the effect of this principle on foreign policy processes will be analyzed. This analysis does not merely take a snapshot of the current situation but also aims to set out the causal mechanisms relating to the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes and to offer applicable implications for policymakers.

The following hypotheses will be tested in this study. The hypotheses were formulated on the basis of the theoretical predictions offered by international relations theories such as democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1986), liberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984), structural realism (Waltz, 1979), and neoclassical realism (Ripsman & Levy, 2008):

- H1: Democratic states with a separation of powers are perceived as more credible and predictable actors in international relations.
- H2: Judicial and legislative oversight of the executive ensures that foreign policy decisions are more long-term and stable.
- H3: In governments lacking a separation of powers, foreign policy is shaped in line with the leader's personal preferences and therefore carries the risk of undergoing sudden changes.
- H4: Great powers act more cautiously in their relations with countries that do not possess a separation-of-powers system and resort more frequently to political interventions.
- H5: Countries with a strong separation of powers exhibit greater adherence to international law and to the rules-based global system.
- H6: In systems where the legislature can oversee foreign policy decisions, adherence to and compliance with international agreements is higher.
- H7: In governments where the separation of powers has weakened, the country's international credibility and diplomatic effectiveness tend to decline.

Hypotheses H1 and H2 are derived from the liberal institutionalist approach's basic assumption that democratic institutions facilitate international cooperation (Moravcsik, 1997). Hypothesis H3 focuses on the risks

created by the centralization of decision-making processes in authoritarian regimes and draws on Svoboda's (2012) analysis of authoritarian governance dynamics. Hypothesis H4 addresses the relationship between power asymmetries and regime type from a realist perspective (Mearsheimer, 2001). Hypotheses H5 and H6 aim to test the link between compliance with international law and internal institutional structure, and Simmons's (2009) findings within the framework of international human rights law support these hypotheses. Hypothesis H7, for its part, aims to examine the effect of democratic backsliding processes on foreign policy outputs and is inspired by Pech and Scheppele's (2017) analyses of the rule of law in the European Union context.

These hypotheses aim to comprehensively evaluate the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes and its role in international relations. Testing the hypotheses will provide valuable data for understanding the importance of democratic values and institutions in the international arena. The systematic testing of the hypotheses will contribute to an understanding not only of the correlational but also of the causal dimensions of the relationship between the separation of powers and foreign policy (George & Bennett, 2005).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The separation of powers is regarded as the cornerstone of democratic governments and takes as its basis the independent functioning of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches from one another (Montesquieu, 1748). This principle draws on the conception of limited government set out by John Locke (1689) in his work *Two Treatises of Government* and represents the institutionalized form of the idea of restraining state power in favor of individual freedoms. This principle is a determining factor in terms of internal governance as much as in terms of international relations, law, organizations, and foreign policy processes (Dahl, 1989). Indeed, in their study *The Logic of Political Survival*, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) set out with empirical evidence that institutional structures—particularly mechanisms that limit the executive—are decisive in shaping states' foreign policy preferences and patterns of international behavior. Within the scope of the literature review, the historical origin of the separation of powers, its effect on democratic governments, its relationship with international law and organizations, its effect on foreign policy, and its place in international relations will be addressed in detail. In this context, the literature review evaluates the separation of powers by positioning it not only within the framework of constitutional law but also at the intersection of the disciplines of comparative politics, international relations, and foreign policy analysis (Lijphart, 2012; Ripsman, 2009).

The idea of the separation of powers extends back to Ancient Greece and Rome. Aristotle (384–322 BC), by dividing the governance of the state into three main categories—the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—laid the foundation of this principle (Aristotle, 350 BC). Polybius, for his part, in examining the constitutional structure of the Roman Republic, developed the concept of the mixed constitution and argued that the mutual balancing of different forms of government is the fundamental condition of political stability (Polybius, 150 BC). However, the concept of the separation of powers in the modern sense became systematic with Montesquieu's work *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748). Examining the English political system, Montesquieu argued that the concentration of power in a single authority would lead to despotism and emphasized that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches must be independent of one another (Gönenç, 2021). This fundamental argument of Montesquieu sets out that the independence of the state's branches from one another is not merely a matter of institutional design but also an ontological precondition of social freedom (Vile, 1998). This idea became the fundamental principle of democratic systems in subsequent periods and was decisive in the formation of many constitutional orders.

James Madison, for his part, in *The Federalist Papers* (1788), expressed that the separation of powers is not merely a theoretical approach but also provides a strong mechanism of checks and balances (Madison, 1788). According to Madison, the mutual oversight and balancing of different powers prevents the abuse of power and ensures the protection of individual freedoms (Huntington, 1991). Ackerman (2000), reinterpreting Madison's traditional model of the separation of powers, argued that new oversight mechanisms such as independent regulatory agencies and electoral commissions have emerged in modern democracies beyond the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and that the concept of the "new separation of powers" should be developed. This approach was adopted particularly strongly in the U.S. constitutional system and became institutionalized as the principle of "checks and balances."

In the literature, it is emphasized that the separation of powers ensures stability in the functioning of the state, reinforces the rule of law, and prevents arbitrary governance (Erdoğan, 2020). Offering a systematic analysis of democratic erosion, Ginsburg and Huq (2018) showed that the gradual increase in the executive's control over the other branches—which they conceptualized as "constitutional retrogression"—constitutes the most widespread mechanism of democratic collapse. Particularly in democratic transition processes, the adoption and implementation of the separation of powers is regarded as a critical factor for the success of the transition from

authoritarianism to democracy (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). In this context, the separation of powers also has a central role in processes of democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Indeed, in his work *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Huntington (1991) argued that the establishment of separation-of-powers mechanisms in the third-wave democratization process was one of the most important institutional building blocks securing the irreversibility of transition processes.

The separation of powers is directly related to concepts such as the rule of law, accountability, and transparency that form the foundation of democratic governments (Habermas, 1989). In democratic countries where this system functions effectively, it is observed that governments better protect the interests of the people, repressive tendencies of governance are forestalled, and the quality of governance is high (Dahl, 1989). In this context, as a result of the cross-national analysis they conducted within the framework of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al. (2011) set out that governance quality—particularly in the dimensions of government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption—is systematically higher in countries where separation-of-powers mechanisms function effectively. Empirical studies conducted show that in countries with a strong separation of powers, the level of corruption is lower, economic development is higher, and individual freedoms are at a more advanced level (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012).

Without the separation of powers, it is observed that the executive strengthens and renders the legislature and judiciary ineffective, which results in the decline of democracy (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). In their work *How Democracies Die*, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) emphasized that the most evident indicator of democratic backsliding is elected leaders' gradual weakening of the independence of the legislative and judicial organs, and that this process generally takes place under the guise of constitutional legitimacy. In studies conducted specifically on Türkiye as well, it is emphasized that the weakening of the separation of powers negatively affects the functioning of democratic institutions and strengthens authoritarian tendencies (Keyman, 2018). In this context, the preservation and strengthening of the separation of powers is of vital importance for the sustainability of democratic systems. Bermeo (2016) set out that democratic backsliding today occurs no longer through classical military coups but through a process termed "executive aggrandizement," in which separation-of-powers mechanisms are eroded under a legal guise; this observation emphasizes the current urgency of preserving the separation of powers.

In democratic regimes, the legislature, by overseeing the executive, ensures that decisions serving the public interest are taken. In the United States, for example, Congress, by overseeing the executive, limits the president's powers and safeguards the constitutional balance (Madison, 1788). Similarly, in European countries, parliamentary systems ensure that governments are accountable and contribute to the sound functioning of democratic processes (Lijphart, 2012). Strøm (2000) showed that the functioning of accountability mechanisms at each link of the chain of delegation in parliamentary systems—from voters to parliament, from parliament to government, and from government to the bureaucracy—is directly related to the implementation of the separation of powers in different forms. In European democracies, the separation of powers is implemented in the form of the prime minister and the government being responsible to the legislature in parliamentary systems, and the legislature and executive working within mutual balance and oversight in presidential systems (Sartori, 1997). In this context, in their comparative analysis of presidential and parliamentary systems, Shugart and Carey (1992) set out that separation-of-powers mechanisms support democratic stability in both types of system but operate through different institutional configurations.

The separation of powers is not confined to the domestic legal order alone but also plays a critical role in the functioning of international law (Dworkin, 1986). In states that comply with the rules of international law, the independence of the legislative and executive branches ensures the more effective implementation of international norms (Keohane, 2005). Slaughter (1995), developing the concept of "liberal interstate relations" in the international legal order, set out systematically that democratic states grounded in the separation of powers exhibit a higher level of compliance with international legal norms, and that this compliance stems from states' internal institutional structures. Particularly in the processes of ratifying and implementing international agreements, the oversight of the legislature facilitates the conformity of these agreements with national interests and their integration into the legal framework (Çelikel & Öztekin Gelgel, 2020).

International judicial bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court, in particular, encourage the strengthening of the separation of powers (Donnelly, 2013). In her empirical study examining the levels of compliance of states party to international human rights agreements, Hathaway (2002) found that states possessing independent judicial organs and strong legislative oversight are significantly more successful in fulfilling their international human rights commitments. In this context, the separation of powers, which is directly connected to the rule-of-law principle, facilitates states' fulfillment of their international

obligations. The integration of international legal norms into domestic law is more successful in systems where the separation of powers functions effectively, and this increases credibility in the international community (Kochenov & Pech, 2015).

In countries party to the European Convention on Human Rights, for example, the existence of independent judicial organs is of great importance in the oversight of human rights violations (Held, 2002). Likewise, the international legal mechanisms supported by the United Nations reveal that significant problems are experienced regarding the impartiality of the judiciary in countries lacking the separation of powers (Fukuyama, 2011). In her comprehensive study *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, Simmons (2009) set out that the effectiveness of international human rights agreements at the national level depends largely on the existence of an independent judiciary and a strong civil society—that is, on the functionality of separation-of-powers mechanisms. The implementation of the international human rights conventions to which Türkiye is also a party is directly related to the preservation of judicial independence, and this once again sets out the importance of the separation of powers (Gemalmaz, 2011).

The separation of powers also plays an important role in relations with international organizations. Countries with democratic governance participate more in international organizations and take a more effective role in these organizations' decision-making processes (Keohane, 2005). Studies in the literature show that countries with strong democratic institutions are more willing in terms of participation in and compliance with international organizations (Moravcsik, 2000). Pevehouse (2005) set out that democratic states' participation in international organizations is not merely a matter of preference but that these organizations offer institutional mechanisms supporting democratization processes, and that states possessing a separation of powers benefit more effectively from these mechanisms. This emphasizes the contribution of the separation of powers to international cooperation and integration processes.

The European Union (EU), for example, regards member states' acting in conformity with the separation of powers as a requirement. The EU's fundamental policies are built upon ensuring the independence of the legislative, executive, and judicial organs and increasing democratic accountability (Börzel, 2018). In the EU accession process, candidate countries' adoption and implementation of the separation of powers is assessed within the framework of the Copenhagen Criteria, and the weakening of this principle can lead to problems in accession negotiations (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). In his study examining the effectiveness of the EU conditionality mechanism, Schimmelfennig (2008) found that the carrying out of separation-of-powers reforms in candidate countries is determined by the credibility of the EU membership perspective and the balance of reform costs; this finding made an important contribution to understanding the dynamics of the diffusion of the separation of powers through international organizations.

Similarly, institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) also emphasize that countries possessing a separation of powers have more stable foreign policy processes and are accepted as more reliable actors in terms of international cooperation (Nye, 2004). The UN Human Rights Council, for example, recommends that member countries strengthen their judicial independence and the separation of powers and publishes regular reports on this matter (Özkan, 2019). In their comprehensive study examining the decision-making processes of international organizations, Tallberg et al. (2013) showed empirically that states with strong democratic institutions and separation-of-powers mechanisms have a disproportionately large influence in shaping the normative agendas of international organizations. This demonstrates that the separation of powers is also accepted as an important democratic value in the eyes of international organizations.

The separation of powers has a critical function in foreign policy decision-making processes. In authoritarian regimes where the executive determines foreign policy on its own, it is observed that decision-making processes are rapid but unpredictable. By contrast, in democratic governments, the participation of legislatures in foreign policy ensures that decision-making processes are more stable and long-term (Mearsheimer, 2001). Fearon (1994) theoretically modeled that democratic states, through the mechanism of domestic audience costs, possess a stronger motivation than authoritarian regimes to fulfill their international commitments, and demonstrated the empirical validity of this model; for separation-of-powers mechanisms make it extremely costly politically for the executive to renege on its promises. Studies in the literature show that in democratic systems foreign policy decisions are taken within a broader framework of consensus, and that this increases stability and credibility in international relations (Kaarbo, 2015).

In the United States, for example, the Senate, by making the ratification of international agreements imperative, prevents the executive from acting unilaterally (Keohane & Nye, 2001). This ensures a more comprehensive assessment of foreign policy decisions and the advance identification of possible risks. Similarly, in parliamentary democracies such as Germany and France, the taking of foreign policy decisions through deliberation by the legislature increases long-term stability and international trust (Rodrik, 2005). In his work *Democratic*

Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation, Martin (2000) set out that the participation of legislatures in the ratification process of international agreements increases the credibility and sustainability of these agreements; for legislative approval is a signal to international public opinion that the commitments given by the executive have been formed on the basis of broad domestic political support. In Türkiye too, the role of the Assembly in the formulation of foreign policy decisions is important in terms of democratic legitimacy (Oran, 2018).

On the other hand, in systems where the separation of powers is weak, foreign policy decisions are generally shaped in line with the leader's personal preferences, and this can lead to sudden changes and inconsistencies in policies (Köse, 2020). In his study examining the foreign policy decision-making processes of authoritarian regimes, Geddes (2003) showed with empirical evidence that the taking of foreign policy decisions by a narrow elite group in these regimes leads to strategic inconsistencies and sudden policy changes owing to the absence of mechanisms of accountability to public opinion. Studies in the literature show that foreign policy decision-making processes in authoritarian regimes are more rapid but riskier, while in democratic systems decision-making processes are slower but more stable (Ripsman & Levy, 2008). This emphasizes the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy stability. Putnam's (1988) two-level game model offers an illuminating framework in this context, setting out that in democratic countries foreign policy decisions are shaped simultaneously both at the international negotiating table and in legislative approval processes at the national level, and that this dual process confers predictability and consistency on foreign policy.

The separation of powers plays an important role in terms of states' credibility and reputation in international relations. Countries with strong democratic oversight mechanisms are seen as more stable partners in international cooperation (Nye, 2004). This stems from the higher levels of adherence of democratic countries to international agreements and commitments. Studies in the literature show that countries with strong democratic institutions internalize international agreements more and are more willing to fulfill the requirements of these agreements (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). In his empirical study examining the fulfillment of international alliance commitments, Leeds (2003) set out that democratic states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms adhere to their alliance obligations at a significantly higher level than authoritarian regimes; this finding supports the thesis that institutional oversight mechanisms increase international credibility.

For example, while countries with democratic governance exhibit greater compliance with global norms such as human rights and the rule of law, authoritarian regimes' adherence to international agreements is lower (Donnelly, 2013). This sets out that in democratic systems the separation of powers ensures greater observance of international obligations. In his study examining mechanisms of compliance with international agreements, Dai (2005) found that states with independent judicial organs and strong legislative oversight have a greater capacity to integrate international norms into their domestic legal systems, and that this is directly related to the functionality of separation-of-powers mechanisms. In addition, it is observed that democratic countries seek more peaceful solutions in international crisis situations and resort more frequently to diplomatic methods (Russett & Oneal, 2001).

Democratic peace theory in the international relations literature holds that the probability of democratic countries going to war with one another is lower (Doyle, 1983). According to this theory, the existence of democratic institutions and the separation of powers encourages the peaceful resolution of disputes among countries and reduces the risk of war. In their comprehensive study *Triangulating Peace*, Russett and Oneal (2001) showed with empirical evidence that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations together form a "Kantian triangle" that supports peace, and the effectiveness of democratic institutions—one of the fundamental legs of this triangle—is directly dependent on the sound functioning of separation-of-powers mechanisms. In this context, the separation of powers is regarded as an important factor contributing to the preservation of international peace and stability (Russett & Oneal, 2001). In their quantitative analyses testing the democratic peace hypothesis, Maoz and Russett (1993) showed that institutional constraints grounded in the separation of powers are as decisive as normative factors in lowering the probability of interstate conflict; this finding constitutes a fundamental reference point for understanding the structural contribution of the separation of powers to international peace.

The separation of powers plays an important role in the shaping of the global security architecture and in the development of international security cooperation. Countries with strong democratic institutions contribute more to collective security mechanisms and take a more active role in preserving international peace (Ikenberry, 2001). In his work *After Victory*, Ikenberry (2001) argued that the stability of the liberal international order established after the Second World War stemmed largely from its creation and maintenance by democratic states grounded in institutional constraints—particularly separation-of-powers mechanisms. Studies in the literature show that

democratic countries pursue more transparent and accountable policies in security matters, and that this contributes to regional and global stability (Karaosmanoğlu, 2019).

International security organizations such as NATO, for example, expect member countries' commitment to democratic values and their adoption of the separation of powers. In this context, the weakening of democratic institutions can reduce the effectiveness of international security cooperation and negatively affect the capacity for joint response to security threats (Leeds, 2003). In their work *Democracies at War*, Reiter and Stam (2002) set out that democratic states are more successful in military conflicts compared with authoritarian regimes, and argued that this success stems from the more rational planning of military strategies thanks to the accountability provided by separation-of-powers mechanisms. In addition, countries with a strong separation of powers display a more cooperative attitude on matters such as disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons and contribute to ensuring global security (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

On the other hand, the security policies of authoritarian regimes are generally less transparent and predictable, which can create a destabilizing effect on regional and global security balances (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). In her work *Dictators at War and Peace*, Weeks (2014) emphasized that the foreign policy and security behavior of authoritarian regimes is not homogeneous, but that the feature common to all types of authoritarian regime is that security policies remain dependent on the threat perceptions of a narrow elite group owing to the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms. Studies in the literature show that in countries where the separation of powers is weak, security policies focus more on regime security and less importance is attached to international cooperation (Kedikli, 2017). This emphasizes the effect of the separation of powers on the global security architecture. In his study examining the effect of the separation of powers on security policies from a civil-military relations perspective, Feaver (2003) set out that legislative and judicial oversight makes decisions on the use of military force more accountable and that this limits unnecessary military adventurism.

The separation of powers plays a critical role in the shaping of global governance structures and in increasing the effectiveness of international institutions. Countries with strong democratic institutions participate more in multilateral cooperation mechanisms and take a more active role in resolving global problems (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). In their study addressing the problem of democratic legitimacy of global governance mechanisms, Keohane et al. (2009) argued that the national-level implementation of the separation of powers serves as an indirect mechanism increasing the accountability of international institutions; for democratic states can oversee their representatives in international institutions through national oversight mechanisms. Studies in the literature show that democratic countries provide more financial and political support to international institutions, and that this increases the effectiveness of global governance (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017).

Particularly in the struggle against transboundary problems such as climate change, pandemics, terrorism, and cybersecurity, the existence of democratic institutions and the separation of powers facilitates international cooperation and contributes to the development of joint solutions (Hale & Held, 2018). In their comparative analysis of climate change policies, Bättig and Bernauer (2009) found that the levels of participation in and rates of compliance with environmental multilateral agreements of democratic states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms are systematically higher; this finding renders concrete the structural contribution of the separation of powers to global environmental governance. In the implementation of global environmental conventions such as the Paris Climate Agreement, for example, it is observed that democratic countries take a more active role and exhibit greater adherence to the agreement's provisions (Aydın, 2021).

The separation of powers also constitutes an important reference point for the democratization of global governance structures and the increase of transparency. In the reform processes of global institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, the strengthening of democratic values and the separation of powers is among the frequently emphasized priorities (Kahler, 2016). In their study examining the democratic deficit of global governance structures, Held and McGrew (2007) argued that the absence at the international level of an equivalent of the balance and oversight mechanisms grounded in the separation of powers at the national level is one of the fundamental causes of the legitimacy crisis of global institutions. In this context, the separation of powers is accepted as one of the fundamental elements of democratic governance at the international level as much as at the national level (Erman & Uhlin, 2010).

In global economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well, demands for the democratization of decision-making processes and for greater transparency are part of efforts toward the application of the separation of powers at the global level (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). According to Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses, enhancing the legitimacy of global economic governance structures will be possible by making these institutions more democratic and accountable (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). In their study examining the bureaucratic structures of international organizations, Barnett and

Finnemore (2004) set out that these organizations' development of oversight mechanisms resembling the separation of powers within themselves—such as independent evaluation units, internal oversight mechanisms, and ombudsman institutions—increases their institutional effectiveness and legitimacy. In this context, the separation of powers constitutes a reference point for the democratization of global governance.

The increasing role of civil society and international CSOs in global governance processes also contributes to strengthening the separation of powers at the international level (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, international advocacy networks function as an informal balance and oversight mechanism by overseeing global institutions and shaping public opinion (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In their work *The Power of Human Rights*, Risse et al. (1999) explained, within the framework of the "spiral model," that transnational advocacy networks ensure the diffusion of human rights norms in repressive regimes and that this process ultimately contributes to the strengthening of separation-of-powers mechanisms. This demonstrates the applicability of the separation of powers at the global level as well.

In today's world, in which digital technologies are developing rapidly and affecting every area of social life, the adaptation of the separation of powers to the digital age and its updating in the face of new challenges is gaining importance. Technological developments such as the internet, social media, and artificial intelligence deeply affect states' internal functioning and international relations, which causes the separation of powers to acquire new dimensions (DeNardis, 2014). In his work *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*, Zuboff (2019) argued that the enormous data-collection capacities of digital technology companies have formed a new locus of power outside the traditional state branches, and that the separation of powers must be redefined not only among state organs but also between the state and private-sector technology actors. Studies in the literature emphasize that the separation of powers in the digital age must also be applied in areas such as cybersecurity, data privacy, and digital rights (Çelik, 2022).

The increase in states' digital surveillance capacities, in particular, allows the executive to use broad powers without judicial oversight, which brings new challenges to the separation of powers (Greenwald, 2014). Documenting in detail the NSA mass surveillance programs exposed by Edward Snowden, Greenwald (2014) showed that the capacity of digital surveillance technologies to circumvent judicial oversight mechanisms constitutes one of the most serious contemporary risks threatening the separation of powers. In addition, the increasing role of social media platforms in processes of political communication and the shaping of public opinion also affects the democratic oversight of the legislative and executive organs (Votmer, 2013). In this context, the preservation and strengthening of the separation of powers in the digital age is of critical importance for the sustainability of democratic systems.

On the other hand, digital technologies facilitate citizens' participation in political processes and increase transparency, which can contribute to strengthening the separation of powers (Diamond, 2019). E-government applications, open data platforms, and digital participation mechanisms allow citizens to oversee state institutions more effectively, which increases democratic accountability (Noveck, 2015). In his work *Smart Citizens, Smarter State*, Noveck (2015) argued that digital technologies not only transform the state-citizen relationship but also evolve the policy-making processes of the legislative and executive organs toward a participatory model, and that this transformation forms a new layer of oversight complementing separation-of-powers mechanisms. In this context, mobilizing the democratic potential of digital technologies can contribute to the effective implementation of the separation of powers in the digital age as well.

In today's world, the separation of powers faces various challenges and threats. The rise of populism, the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies, and global democratic backsliding in particular stand out as elements threatening the separation of powers (Özbudun, 2018). In their study offering a comparative analysis of populism, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) set out that populist leaders systematically attempt to weaken judicial independence and legislative oversight, and that this tendency constitutes one of the most widespread contemporary vectors of the erosion of separation-of-powers mechanisms. Studies in the literature show that in recent years democratic institutions have weakened worldwide and the separation of powers has eroded (Freedom House, 2023). This increases the risk of instability and distrust in international relations. The global democracy reports of the V-Dem Institute (2023) documented with empirical evidence that over the past decade the number of countries entering a process of autocratization has exceeded the number of countries in a process of democratization, and that this trend is directly related to the systematic decline in separation-of-powers indices.

In countries such as Hungary and Poland, for example, the weakening of judicial independence has created a rule-of-law crisis within the European Union (Pech & Scheppele, 2017). Examining in detail the processes of constitutional backsliding in Hungary and Poland, Pech and Scheppele (2017) set out that the executive's gradual

establishment of control over the judiciary in these countries—changing judicial appointment processes, limiting the powers of constitutional courts, and weakening judicial oversight mechanisms—shook the foundations of the EU's rules-based order. Similarly, in some countries in Latin America and the Middle East, the erosion of the separation of powers has contributed to regional instability (Levitsky & Way, 2020). In Türkiye, for its part, the strengthening of the executive as a result of constitutional amendments has given rise to new challenges in the implementation of the separation of powers (Özkan, 2019). Analyzing the process of democratic backsliding in Türkiye, Esen and Gümüşçü (2016) emphasized that the executive's increasing dominance over the legislative and judicial branches in the 2010s seriously disrupted the balance of the separation of powers, and that this negatively affected both the country's internal democratic functioning and its credibility in international relations.

In the face of these challenges, it is emphasized that the separation of powers should be strengthened and adapted to new conditions. In particular, it is recommended that the effectiveness of democratic oversight mechanisms be increased and civil society be strengthened by making use of the opportunities offered by digital technologies (Noveck, 2015). Ginsburg and Huq (2018) argued that, in order to increase democratic resilience, separation-of-powers mechanisms should be designed to serve as "constitutional insurance," maintaining in particular that the safeguarding of judicial independence, the autonomy of electoral commissions, and media pluralism constitutes the most effective institutional shields against democratic erosion. In addition, the increase of international cooperation and solidarity can contribute to the preservation of democratic values and the separation of powers at the global level (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019). In this context, Diamond (2019) emphasized that in the struggle against democratic backsliding, institutional reforms at the national level alone are not sufficient, and that international mechanisms of democratic solidarity—such as the collective application of pressure by democratic states against authoritarian tendencies, the strengthening of democratic conditionality mechanisms, and the provision of international support to civil society—are of vital importance.

In conclusion, the separation of powers continues to be the cornerstone of democratic systems and retains its importance as an element of stability and trust in international relations. The strengthening of this principle and its adaptation in the face of new challenges is of critical importance both for the sustainability of democratic institutions at the national level and for the preservation of peace and cooperation at the international level (Müftüler-Baç, 2023). In conclusion, when the literature review is assessed as a whole, it becomes clearly evident that the separation of powers is not merely an element of national constitutional orders but also a structural variable shaping states' international behavior, their credibility, and their contributions to global governance; this observation provides a sound conceptual foundation for the empirical analyses to be carried out in the subsequent sections of the study.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The separation of powers is directly related to the theory of the balance of powers. The balance of powers refers to the establishment of a system in which the three principal organs of the state—the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary—check and balance one another (Montesquieu, 1748). This theory aims to safeguard democratic accountability and the rule of law by preventing the excessive concentration of any power. Indeed, in his comprehensive historical work *Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*, Vile (1998) traced the intellectual evolution of the separation-of-powers doctrine from Ancient Greece to modern constitutionalism and showed that the principle is not merely a normative ideal but also the most effective institutional mechanism for limiting state power. In *The Federalist Papers*, James Madison emphasized the necessity of the separation of powers and set out the principle that "power must check power" (Madison, 1788). For Madison, the passion for power inherent in human nature renders the mutual oversight of state organs imperative (Hamilton et al., 2009). In this context, Ackerman (2000), moving beyond the traditional tripartite model of the separation of powers, argued that modern democratic states should be supported by additional oversight bodies such as independent regulatory agencies, ombudsman mechanisms, and constitutional courts, thereby introducing the concept of the "new separation of powers" into the literature.

In modern democratic systems, the theory of the balance of powers is implemented through tight oversight mechanisms in countries with a constitutional order. In the United States, for example, the legislative and executive organs within the presidential system possess separate powers that check one another (Lijphart, 1999). Congress's legislative powers, the president's veto power, and the Supreme Court's power of constitutional review constitute concrete examples of the balance of powers (Neustadt, 1990). As Neustadt (1990) emphasized, in the U.S. presidential system power requires an ongoing process of negotiation over shared authorities; this likewise makes a continuous search for balance between the executive and the legislature imperative in the making of foreign policy decisions. In the parliamentary systems of Europe, the balance between legislature and executive is more flexible, and the government's responsibility to parliament comes to the fore (Sartori, 1997). While this flexibility allows rapid decision-making, democratic accountability is preserved through parliamentary oversight

mechanisms. In his comparative study *Patterns of Democracy*, Lijphart (1999) showed that the separation of powers is applied more strictly in consensus democracies, whereas the executive-legislative relationship is more intertwined in majoritarian models; he nevertheless demonstrated that democratic accountability can be ensured through different mechanisms in both models.

In Türkiye, the separation of powers functions as a mechanism that oversees the legislative and executive branches through the Constitutional Court and other judicial organs (Gözler, 2011). Following the 2017 constitutional amendment, a transition was made to the Presidential Government System, which produced significant changes in the balance of the separation of powers (Gülener & Miş, 2017). The strengthening of the executive in the new system has affected the oversight capacity of the legislative and judicial organs, giving rise to academic and political debate (Akıncı, 2019). In assessing the constitutional transformation process in Türkiye, Özbudun (2018) argued that the Presidential Government System deviates from the classical separation-of-powers model and that the increase in the executive's influence over the legislature and the judiciary has weakened the functionality of democratic balance and oversight mechanisms. In this context, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) emphasized that democratic erosion is usually realized through the gradual weakening of separation-of-powers mechanisms by elected leaders, and that this process brings with it unpredictability in foreign policy and a loss of international trust.

The repercussions of the theory of the balance of powers in international relations are also evident in interstate relations. According to Waltz (1979), the maintenance of a balance of power in the international system contributes to the stability of the system by preventing any single state from becoming a hegemonic power. Similarly, the balance of powers within states' internal structures ensures that foreign policy decisions are more balanced and predictable (Putnam, 1988). Putnam's (1988) two-level game model analytically sets out how domestic political structures—particularly separation-of-powers mechanisms—shape states' bargaining space (win-set) in international negotiations, showing that in systems where the legislature's power of approval is strong, negotiators possess a stronger bargaining position in the international arena. In democratic systems, the passage of foreign policy decisions through various institutional filters helps to avoid extreme policies and to safeguard long-term national interests (Doyle, 2005). Fearon (1994) explained this mechanism through the concept of "audience costs" and showed that the domestic political costs faced by democratic leaders should they renege on their international commitments make the separation-of-powers system a structural element that enhances credibility in foreign policy.

The rule of law is the cornerstone of the democratic conception of governance and is directly connected to the principle of the separation of powers (Raz, 1977). For a state's democratic functioning to be sustainable, laws must be independent of arbitrary application, the executive must act within legal limits, and the judiciary must be fully independent (Dworkin, 1986). The rule-of-law principle envisages not merely the existence of legal regulations but also their fair, equitable, and predictable application (Tamanaha, 2004). Tamanaha (2004) drew attention to two distinct interpretations of the concept of the rule of law—"thin" and "thick"—noting that the thin interpretation covers only procedural requirements, while the thick interpretation also encompasses substantive values such as human rights, democratic participation, and social justice; in both interpretations, the separation of powers is positioned as the principal institutional guarantee of the rule of law.

The principle of the separation of powers, by contributing to the formation of the rule-of-law state, protects individual freedoms and human rights. In this regard, constitutional review mechanisms and judicial independence ensure the rule of law by defining the limits of the executive and legislative branches (Fuller, 1969). Constitutional courts, for example, contribute to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by reviewing the constitutionality of laws enacted by the legislature (Stone Sweet, 2000). This review both improves the quality of legislative processes and safeguards citizens' fundamental rights. In his study examining the rise of constitutional courts in Europe, Stone Sweet (2000) showed that these courts function as the "third pillar" of the separation of powers, preserving the balance between the legislature and the executive, and that, particularly in the area of foreign policy, constitutional review of the conformity of international agreements strengthens states' adherence to international law.

International legal bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) assume important roles in ensuring legal certainty in states possessing a separation of powers (Slaughter, 2004). The ECtHR contributes to the preservation of democratic standards by issuing rulings aimed at strengthening member states' judicial independence and rule of law (Aydın, 2018). Similarly, advisory bodies such as the Venice Commission support democratic governance by issuing recommendations aimed at strengthening the separation of powers in member states (Turan, 2020). In his comprehensive study of compliance processes with international court rulings, Hillebrecht (2014) showed with empirical evidence that the rate of compliance with ECtHR rulings is significantly

higher in states with a strong separation of powers; this finding demonstrates that democratic oversight mechanisms within the domestic legal order directly determine the effectiveness of international judicial rulings. In Germany, for example, the Federal Constitutional Court guarantees the rule of law by reviewing whether the state's legislative and executive branches act in conformity with the law (Kommers & Miller, 2012). The court plays an effective role in protecting fundamental rights and maintaining the democratic order, and can annul the decisions of the legislative and executive organs when necessary. Similarly, the Conseil Constitutionnel in France is a review mechanism that ensures the preservation of the constitutional order (Troper, 2013). These high courts constitute a critical element of balance in the functioning of democratic systems. Kommers and Miller (2012) emphasized that the doctrine of "constitutional identity" developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court in assessing the effect of international agreements on domestic law is an important mechanism that safeguards the separation of powers and reviews the conformity of the executive's internationally given commitments with the national constitutional order.

In Türkiye, institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Council of State function as structures that review the powers of the executive and legislative organs within the constitutional framework (Özbudun, 2018). With the Constitutional Court's recognition of the right of individual application, citizens can apply directly to the court in cases where their fundamental rights and freedoms are violated, which contributes to strengthening the rule-of-law principle (Çelik, 2019). However, the politicization of the judiciary and concerns regarding judicial independence create difficulties for the effective implementation of the rule of law (Kalaycıoğlu, 2020). Pech and Scheppele (2017) argued that in systems where judicial independence has been eroded—including Türkiye—the rule of law is preserved only formally, while in essence separation-of-powers mechanisms have been rendered dysfunctional; they showed that this situation leads to serious tension and loss of trust in these countries' relations with international institutions.

International law requires that states' internal governance structures be established within a legal framework and administered in conformity with human rights (Hathaway, 2002). In this context, the separation of powers is regarded as a mechanism that enhances states' compliance with international legal norms (Donnelly, 2013). In her empirical study examining the levels of compliance of states party to international human rights agreements, Hathaway (2002) showed that separation-of-powers mechanisms—particularly independent judicial organs—play a decisive role in transposing international commitments into domestic law. In the international legal order, a direct relationship is recognized between states' internal democratic structures and their behavior in foreign policy (Slaughter, 1995). Democratic states, in particular, exhibit greater adherence to international human rights conventions thanks to their separation-of-powers-based forms of government (Risse, 2000). In her comprehensive study *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, Simmons (2009) showed with empirical evidence that independent judicial organs and legislative oversight play a decisive role in the domestic incorporation of international human rights norms, finding that the level of implementation of these norms is significantly higher in states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms.

International organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe encourage the adoption of the separation of powers as a fundamental element of democratic governments. The Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council assesses member states' performance in critical areas such as judicial independence, legislative oversight, and the limitation of the executive (Erdoğan, 2021). This oversight contributes to the implementation of international legal standards at the national level. Within the framework of the "spiral model" examining the process of the domestic internalization of international norms, Risse (2000) argued that separation-of-powers mechanisms—particularly an independent judiciary and civil society—function as a critical "domestic pressure mechanism" in embedding international human rights norms in state practice.

In the enlargement process of the European Union (EU), for example, candidate countries are expected to carry out reforms in conformity with the principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence (Moravcsik, 1997). These standards, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, make it imperative that the institutional and legal framework be brought into line with democratic principles for accession to the EU (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). In this context, the EU's rule-of-law mechanism is seen as an important instrument for ensuring the preservation of the separation of powers in member states (Pech & Scheppele, 2017). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) analyzed the effectiveness of the EU's conditionality mechanism in promoting separation-of-powers reforms in candidate countries, but also showed that the weakening of this conditionality in the post-accession period paved the way for the erosion of the separation of powers in some member states.

From the standpoint of international law, the separation of powers not only regulates internal governance mechanisms but also offers a framework that reviews whether states' foreign policy practices conform to legal norms (Keohane & Nye, 2001). In democratic systems, for example, the role of the legislature in the process of

ratifying international agreements ensures that these agreements are compatible with national interests and the legal system (Çamyamaç, 2016). This increases states' adherence to their international commitments and raises the level of compliance with international law. In his study examining mechanisms of compliance with international agreements, Dai (2005) found that states with independent judicial organs and strong legislative oversight have a greater capacity to integrate international norms into their domestic legal systems, and that this is directly related to the functionality of separation-of-powers mechanisms.

Institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) ensure the application of international legal rules by reviewing the arbitrary and human-rights-violating actions of executive organs (Slaughter, 2004). The ICC's principle of complementarity, while encouraging the functioning of national judicial systems, aims to guarantee that serious human rights violations do not go unpunished (Donnelly, 2013). This underscores the importance of the separation of powers within the international legal order. Slaughter (2004) argued that the international legal order is increasingly evolving toward a "disaggregated state" model—that is, that the legislative, executive, and judicial organs of states interact directly with their international counterparts—and emphasized that the effectiveness of this interaction depends largely on the soundness of separation-of-powers mechanisms at the national level.

The principle of the separation of powers also plays an important role in the functioning of international organizations. Organizations such as the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Union (EU) expect member states to act in conformity with the principles of democratic governance (Keohane, 2005). These organizations also adopt a certain degree of separation of powers within their own internal structures, establishing balance and oversight mechanisms by distributing authority among different organs (Weiss & Daws, 2018). In his study *Democracy from Above*, Pevehouse (2005) systematically examined the contribution of international regional organizations to democratization processes and found that states possessing a separation of powers assume more active and constructive roles in these organizations; this finding confirms the mutually reinforcing relationship between membership in international organizations and internal institutional structure.

The EU, in particular, regards states that adopt a separation-of-powers-based form of government as more reliable partners (Moravcsik, 1997). The EU's institutional structure rests on a distribution of authority among the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission, while the Court of Justice of the European Union ensures the rule of law (Bilgin, 2018). This structure shows that the separation of powers can also be applied at the supranational level. Within the framework of the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik (1997) argued that the EU's institutional architecture exhibits a structure that reproduces member states' separation-of-powers mechanisms at the supranational level, and that this structure is one of the fundamental factors enhancing the EU's international credibility.

The judicial mechanisms of international organizations are also among the structures that strengthen the separation of powers. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for example, contributes to the development of separation-of-powers-based legal systems by ensuring the protection of judicial independence in Council of Europe member states (Donnelly, 2013). The ECtHR's case law on the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, and rule-of-law principles helps to raise democratic standards in member states' domestic legal systems (Kochenov, 2017). In their comparative study examining the legitimacy and accountability mechanisms of international organizations, Tallberg et al. (2016) showed that member states with a strong separation of powers display a more transparent and participatory attitude in these organizations' decision-making processes and contribute more substantially to the strengthening of internal oversight mechanisms.

International organizations can develop more robust cooperation with countries possessing a separation of powers and promote a democratic conception of governance. Security organizations such as NATO, for example, regard member countries' possession of separation-of-powers-based democratic systems as a security standard (Waltz, 1979). NATO's principle of commitment to democratic values is regarded as one of the alliance's fundamental principles (Aydin, 2020). This demonstrates the strong link between international organizations and a democratic conception of governance. In his work *After Victory*, Ikenberry (2001) argued that the stability of the liberal international order established after the Second World War stemmed largely from its creation and maintenance by democratic states grounded in institutional constraints—particularly separation-of-powers mechanisms—and emphasized that structures such as NATO and the Bretton Woods institutions formed the cornerstones of this order.

International relations theories demonstrate that the separation of powers enables states to produce peaceful policies and strengthens international cooperation (Waltz, 1979). Democratic peace theory holds that states

possessing a separation of powers display a less conflictual attitude in the international arena (Doyle, 1986). According to Michael Doyle, democratic institutions and the separation of powers limit aggressive and expansionist tendencies in states' foreign policies and encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Doyle, 1986). This approach is supported in particular by liberal theorists and reinforced by empirical evidence. In their comprehensive study *Triangulating Peace*, Russett and Oneal (2001) showed with empirical evidence that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations together form a "Kantian triangle" that supports peace, and the effectiveness of democratic institutions—one of the fundamental legs of this triangle—is directly dependent on the sound functioning of separation-of-powers mechanisms. In their quantitative analyses testing the democratic peace hypothesis, Maoz and Russett (1993) showed that institutional constraints grounded in the separation of powers are as decisive as normative factors in lowering the probability of interstate conflict; this finding constitutes a fundamental reference point for understanding the structural contribution of the separation of powers to international peace.

From a liberal institutionalist perspective, the separation of powers increases states' propensity for international cooperation (Keohane & Nye, 2001). According to Robert Keohane, the existence of democratic institutions strengthens states' adherence to international agreements and contributes to the formation of an atmosphere of mutual trust (Keohane, 1984). In this context, states possessing a separation of powers exhibit greater compliance with international agreements and rules-based systems, which in turn enhances the effectiveness of global governance. In his work *After Hegemony*, Keohane (1984), in analyzing the sustainability of international regimes even in the absence of a hegemonic power, emphasized that the contributions of democratic states—through separation-of-powers mechanisms—to the functioning of international institutions play a decisive role in the stability of these regimes. In their study examining the interaction between international law and international relations, Abbott and Snidal (2000) showed that states with a strong separation of powers exhibit greater adherence to "hard law" arrangements and that this adherence enhances the credibility of international cooperation mechanisms.

Realist approaches, for their part, hold that the separation of powers, by creating domestic political constraints, limits states' foreign policy options (Mearsheimer, 2001). According to John Mearsheimer, the balance of powers in democratic systems can weaken states' capacity to protect their national interests, and this can affect the struggle for power in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2001). Yet this approach too acknowledges the capacity of democratic institutions to produce stable foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of the separation of powers in terms of predictability and credibility. From a neoclassical realist perspective, Ripsman and Levy (2008) analyzed the effect of domestic political institutions on foreign policy outputs, showing that separation-of-powers mechanisms function as "intervening variables" in the process of translating systemic pressures into foreign policy, and that, depending on the strength of these mechanisms, states can produce different foreign policy responses to similar international pressures. In this context, Krasner (1978) argued that internal institutional structures—particularly the separation of powers—play a decisive role in shaping states' definitions of national interest and their foreign policy strategies, and that in states where these structures are strong, foreign policy preferences rest on a more rational and consistent basis.

Constructivist theories hold that the separation of powers plays an important role in the diffusion of international norms and values (Wendt, 1992). According to Alexander Wendt, states' internal structures and identity perceptions shape their behavior in international relations, while democratic institutions and the separation of powers contribute to the diffusion of values such as cooperation, peace, and human rights (Wendt, 1999). In this context, the separation of powers is seen not merely as a matter of internal governance but also as a normative force shaping international relations. In his work *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt (1999) argued that states' identities and interests are constructed within processes of social interaction; viewed from this perspective, he argued that democratic states possessing a separation of powers are carrier actors in the diffusion of the cooperation and peace norms that constitute what is termed the "Kantian culture" in the international arena. In his study examining the effect of democratic norms on international relations, Risse-Kappen (1995) showed that separation-of-powers mechanisms shape the processes by which states legitimize their foreign policy decisions, and that these legitimization processes directly determine the quality of international cooperation.

In this respect, the separation of powers, through mechanisms of democratic accountability, enables the adoption of more predictable and stable policies in international crisis management (Keohane & Nye, 2001). In democratic systems, the passage of foreign policy decisions through various institutional filters allows extreme reactions to be prevented and risks to be better assessed (Rosecrance, 1986). This can enable the preference for diplomatic solutions in times of crisis and the reduction of the risk of conflict. In their comprehensive study systematically examining international crises, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) showed with empirical evidence that democratic states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms behave more cautiously in crisis situations, give greater

priority to diplomatic solutions, and that the probability of crisis escalation is significantly lower in these states. In their classic study applying the bureaucratic politics model to foreign policy analysis, Allison and Zelikow (1999) emphasized that the separation-of-powers system enables the production of more balanced foreign policy outputs through the competition and accommodation of different institutional actors, and that this pluralistic decision-making process serves a critical function, especially in times of crisis, in preventing unilateral and hasty decisions.

From the perspective of economic liberalism, the principle of the separation of powers is of critical importance for economic stability and development (North, 1990). According to Douglass North, the quality of institutional structures and political systems grounded in the separation of powers are indispensable conditions for economic growth and prosperity (North, 1990). The separation of powers safeguards the protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and the sound functioning of the market economy (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012). In his work *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, North (1990), in analyzing the decisive effect of institutional structures on economic performance, argued that political systems grounded in the separation of powers lower transaction costs by providing the guarantee of property rights and make it easier for economic actors to make long-term investment decisions; this mechanism also ensures that states are perceived as reliable partners in international economic relations.

As Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson emphasized in their work *Why Nations Fail*, inclusive institutions grounded in the separation of powers constitute the foundation of sustainable economic growth and prosperity (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012). According to the authors, the limitation of the executive and the adoption of the separation of powers make it possible to ensure fairness in the distribution of resources, to support innovative activities, and to open economic opportunities to broad segments of society. This enhances not only domestic economic stability but also credibility in international economic relations. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) showed, within a broad historical-comparative analysis, that the fundamental distinction between inclusive institutions and extractive institutions is directly related to whether the executive is effectively limited, and demonstrated that in the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms economic institutions acquire an extractive character, which negatively affects countries' international economic integration.

In international trade and investment relations, countries with a strong separation of powers are seen as more reliable partners (Rodrik, 2007). According to Dani Rodrik, the existence of democratic institutions and the separation of powers provides important guarantees in terms of the protection of property rights, judicial independence, and the stability of economic policies, which constitutes an important advantage in attracting foreign investment (Rodrik, 2007). Economic actors perceive lower risk and can make long-term investment decisions in countries where decisions are not taken by a single authority and where institutional oversight mechanisms function. In their study examining the relationship between participation in international trade agreements and internal institutional structures, Büthe and Milner (2008) found that states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms are integrated to a higher degree into international trade regimes, and that this integration is directly related to the credibility provided by internal institutional guarantees. Rodrik (2007) argued that democratic institutions function as a "commitment device" in economic policy, showing with empirical evidence that separation-of-powers mechanisms, by providing investors with assurance regarding policy stability, increase flows of foreign direct investment and facilitate international economic cooperation.

Studies conducted specifically on Türkiye also confirm the effects of the separation of powers on economic stability and development (Pamuk, 2018). According to Şevket Pamuk, the strengthening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers in Türkiye's economic development is of critical importance for ensuring sustainable development (Pamuk, 2018). In particular, the rule of law, judicial independence, and the transparency of economic policies are regarded as important elements of trust for international investors and trade partners. In his study examining Türkiye's economic history from a long-term perspective, Pamuk (2018) showed with historical data that in periods when separation-of-powers mechanisms were strengthened, economic growth was more stable and sustainable, whereas in periods when these mechanisms weakened, economic uncertainty increased and international investor confidence was shaken.

Civil society and the media play a critical role in the functional implementation and strengthening of the separation of powers (Diamond, 1994). According to Larry Diamond, a vibrant civil society and an independent media function as a "fourth power" in overseeing the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, beyond the official institutional structures (Diamond, 1994). In this context, civil society organizations (CSOs) and media outlets assume a complementary role in the implementation of the separation of powers and contribute to enhancing democratic accountability. In his work *Ill Winds*, Diamond (2019) emphasized that, under today's conditions in which the trend of democratic backsliding has accelerated globally, the role of civil society and the independent

media in preserving the separation of powers has become even more critical; with reference to Freedom House (2023) data, he showed that in countries where press freedom has been restricted, separation-of-powers mechanisms have also been systematically weakened.

An independent media supports the separation-of-powers system through such functions as ensuring the transparency of public policies, exposing corruption, and informing public opinion (Voltmer, 2013). In systems where the media can preserve its independence, citizens can access more accurate information about the activities of state institutions, which strengthens democratic participation and oversight (Çelik, 2020). Investigative journalism, in particular, contributes to the effectiveness of the separation-of-powers system by increasing the transparency of the executive's activities. In her comparative study examining the role of the media in countries undergoing democratization, Voltmer (2013) showed that an independent media performs an "informal accountability" function supporting the functionality of separation-of-powers mechanisms, and that in systems where media freedom is restricted, official oversight mechanisms also weaken; this finding confirms the mutually reinforcing relationship between media independence and the separation of powers.

Civil society organizations play an important role in preserving the separation of powers through such activities as rights advocacy, policy monitoring, and shaping public opinion (Kaldor, 2003). Institutions such as human rights organizations, think tanks, and professional associations monitor the activities of state organs, identifying possible rights violations and abuses of authority, and drawing public attention to these issues (Keyman, 2015). These activities, alongside official oversight mechanisms, constitute a complementary element in preserving the separation of powers. In their pioneering study examining the role of transnational advocacy networks in preserving democratic norms and the separation of powers, Keck and Sikkink (1998) showed that, by creating a "boomerang effect" at the national and international levels, civil society organizations can mobilize international pressure mechanisms against attempts to weaken domestic separation-of-powers mechanisms.

In the context of international relations, the independence of civil society and the media enhances a country's democratic image and its credibility in the international arena (Price, 2002). According to Monroe Price, the existence of an independent media and civil society is regarded by the international community as an important indicator of commitment to democratic values, which creates a positive effect in countries' diplomatic relations and their interactions with international organizations (Price, 2002). International institutions that emphasize democratic values, such as the EU in particular, encourage media freedom and a strong civil society in member and candidate countries. Within the framework of the concept of "soft power," Nye (2004) argued that democratic countries with an independent media and a strong civil society possess a more effective power of attraction in international relations, and emphasized that the sound functioning of separation-of-powers mechanisms constitutes one of the fundamental components of a country's soft power.

Global governance refers to the increasing role of non-state actors, international organizations, and multilateral cooperation mechanisms in international relations (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). The principle of the separation of powers plays an important role in ensuring the democratic legitimacy of global governance structures and in enhancing transparency (Held & McGrew, 2007). According to David Held, increasing the democratic accountability of global institutions can be possible through the application of the separation of powers at the international level (Held, 2004). In developing his model of cosmopolitan democracy, Held (2004) argued that the principle of the separation of powers should be transferred from the national to the global level, maintaining that the legitimacy crisis of international institutions can be overcome only by separating the legislative, executive, and judicial functions within these institutions; this perspective demonstrates that the separation of powers should be addressed not only as a national principle but also as a fundamental design principle of global governance.

In global governance mechanisms, the participation of different actors in decision-making processes and the establishment of institutional oversight structures can be seen as the repercussions of the separation of powers at the international level (Keohane & Nye, 2000). In the United Nations system, for example, the existence of different organs such as the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council, together with the independent role of the International Court of Justice, reflects a certain degree of separation of powers (Karns & Mingst, 2010). However, problems of democratic accountability and representation persist in global governance structures, which makes the full application of the separation of powers at the international level difficult. In their comprehensive study examining the governance structures of international organizations, Karns and Mingst (2010), while acknowledging that the institutional division within the UN system differs structurally from separation-of-powers mechanisms at the national level, argued that this institutional design serves a certain balance and oversight function in international decision-making processes, and that the veto mechanism of the Security Council, in particular, creates a kind of "negative separation of powers" among the great powers.

In global economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), demands for the democratization of decision-making processes and for greater transparency are part of efforts toward the application of the separation of powers at the global level (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). According to Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses, enhancing the legitimacy of global economic governance structures will be possible by making these institutions more democratic and accountable (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). In this context, the separation of powers constitutes a reference point for the democratization of global governance. In their study discussing the future of global governance, Weiss and Wilkinson (2014) argued that the accountability deficit of international institutions can be remedied only by strengthening independent oversight mechanisms within these institutions—such as international courts, independent evaluation bodies, and parliamentary oversight structures; this proposal offers a concrete roadmap for adapting the separation of powers to the global level.

The increasing role of civil society and international CSOs in global governance processes also contributes to strengthening the separation of powers at the international level (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, international advocacy networks function as an informal balance and oversight mechanism by overseeing global institutions and shaping public opinion (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). This demonstrates the applicability of the separation of powers at the global level as well. In their studies on the restructuring of global governance, Gardels and Berggruen (2019) argued that the balance between democratic legitimacy and governance effectiveness can be ensured by reinterpreting the separation of powers at the global level, emphasizing in particular the necessity of establishing a balance between "long-term governance bodies" and "short-term democratic accountability mechanisms." In his study examining the relationship between globalization and global governance, Kahler (2016) showed that effective multilateral cooperation in resolving transboundary problems such as climate change, migration, and pandemics is sustainable only insofar as it depends on the soundness of participating states' internal institutional structures—particularly separation-of-powers mechanisms.

Technological developments, especially in areas such as the internet, social media, and artificial intelligence, create new opportunities and challenges for the implementation of the separation of powers (DeNardis, 2014). According to Laura DeNardis, digital technologies, while on the one hand contributing to greater transparency and accountability of state organs, can on the other hand make the implementation of the separation of powers more difficult by offering new possibilities for surveillance and control (DeNardis, 2014). This reveals the need to redefine and strengthen the separation of powers in the digital age. In her study examining the global governance dimension of the internet, DeNardis (2014) argued that the governance of digital infrastructure—from domain name allocation to data flow regulations—raises the need for a new "digital separation of powers," emphasizing that the distribution of technical standard-setting, content regulation, and surveillance powers among different institutional actors is imperative for establishing balance and oversight mechanisms in the digital domain as well.

E-government applications and open data policies support the separation-of-powers system by enabling citizens to monitor and oversee state institutions more effectively (Meijer et al., 2012). According to Albert Meijer and colleagues, digital technologies offer new mechanisms that ensure citizens' direct participation and oversight, beyond traditional democratic institutions (Meijer et al., 2012). This allows the separation of powers to be implemented in a more participatory and effective manner in the digital age. Meijer et al. (2012) reassessed the concept of open governance in the context of the separation of powers in the digital age, arguing that the direct monitoring and oversight capacity that digital platforms provide to citizens can function as a "fifth power" complementing traditional separation-of-powers mechanisms.

However, digital surveillance technologies can threaten the separation of powers by increasing states' capacity to monitor and control individuals (Greenwald, 2014). According to Glenn Greenwald, mass surveillance programs can be implemented without judicial oversight, which can lead to the erosion of the separation of powers (Greenwald, 2014). In this context, mobilizing the democratic potential of digital technologies and effectively overseeing surveillance powers is of critical importance for the future of the separation of powers. In his analysis based on Edward Snowden's revelations, Greenwald (2014) showed that the mass surveillance programs of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) were conducted largely independently of legislative and judicial oversight, demonstrating that this constitutes one of the most serious threats to the separation of powers in the digital age and that technological developments have far outpaced democratic oversight mechanisms. In developing the concept of "surveillance capitalism," Zuboff (2019) showed that the private sector too possesses a capacity to collect and use individuals' digital data as great as—and in some cases greater than—that of the state, demonstrating that the separation of powers cannot be confined to the balance among state organs alone and that the digital power of the private sector must also be subjected to democratic oversight.

Artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making systems also create new challenges for the separation of powers (Balkin, 2020). According to Jack Balkin, the transparency and accountability problems of algorithmic systems make democratic oversight difficult, which can hinder the effective implementation of the separation of powers (Balkin, 2020). In this context, the independent auditing of artificial intelligence systems and the development of ethical standards are seen as important steps for preserving the separation of powers in the digital age. Balkin (2020) argued that the increasing use of algorithmic decision-making systems by the legislative, executive, and judicial organs makes it imperative to subject these systems to independent oversight in terms of transparency and accountability, defining the concept of "algorithmic accountability" as a new dimension of the separation of powers in the digital age.

Specifically, in the case of Türkiye, the effects of digital transformation processes on the separation of powers are attracting increasing attention in academic studies (Binark, 2018). According to Mutlu Binark, mobilizing the democratic potential of digital technologies in Türkiye offers important opportunities for strengthening the separation of powers (Binark, 2018). E-government applications, open data platforms, and digital participation mechanisms can increase citizens' participation in democratic processes and support the separation-of-powers system. Digital platforms, on the one hand, strengthen civil society's advocacy activities aimed at preserving separation-of-powers mechanisms, while on the other hand the increase in the state's capacity for digital surveillance and content regulation can limit this potential; this contradiction shows that preserving the separation of powers in the digital age requires new strategies and institutional designs (DeNardis, 2014).

The principle of the separation of powers examined within the theoretical framework is of critical importance in the functioning of democratic governments and in international relations. By forming the foundation of democratic balance and oversight mechanisms, the separation of powers prevents the concentration of state power in a single hand and protects individual rights and freedoms (Montesquieu, 1748; Madison, 1788). Just as this principle ensures democratic accountability and transparency in domestic politics, it also creates stability and credibility in foreign policy (Keohane & Nye, 2001). The synthesis of the perspectives addressed in the theoretical framework—democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1986; Russett & Oneal, 2001), liberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984; Moravcsik, 1997), structural and neoclassical realism (Waltz, 1979; Ripsman & Levy, 2008), and constructivist theory (Wendt, 1999)—provides a comprehensive conceptual foundation for understanding the multidimensional role of the separation of powers in international relations.

From the perspective of international law and organizations, the separation of powers increases states' adherence to international norms and commitments, which in turn contributes to global stability (Risse, 2000; Donnelly, 2013). Countries with strong democratic institutions are more open to international cooperation and play a more constructive role in resolving global problems. Moreover, the separation of powers emerges as an indispensable element for economic stability and development as well (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012; Rodrik, 2007). The studies of Simmons (2009) and Dai (2005) examining mechanisms of compliance with international law support, at the empirical level, the theoretical discussions addressed in this section, showing that the levels of compliance with international norms of states possessing independent judicial organs and strong legislative oversight are significantly higher. On the economic dimension, the institutional analysis perspectives of North (1990) and Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) set out the decisive effect of separation-of-powers mechanisms on economic performance and international economic integration; this finding confirms that the separation of powers is an important building block of the international system not only politically but also in terms of economic stability.

In the digital age, the separation of powers creates new opportunities and challenges (DeNardis, 2014; Greenwald, 2014). Technological developments, while on the one hand increasing the possibilities for democratic participation and oversight, on the other hand offer new mechanisms of surveillance and control. In this context, adapting and strengthening the separation of powers for the digital age is of critical importance for the sustainability of democratic systems. As the studies of Balkin (2020) and Zuboff (2019) demonstrate, preserving the separation of powers in the process of digital transformation must be supported not only by traditional institutional designs but also by new instruments such as algorithmic accountability, judicial oversight of digital surveillance, and the strengthening of data protection mechanisms; this necessity shows that the separation of powers bears a dynamic and evolutionary character and must be adapted to the conditions of the age.

In conclusion, the separation of powers continues to be the cornerstone of democratic governments and retains its importance as an element of stability and trust in international relations. The preservation and strengthening of this principle is of indispensable importance both for the sustainability of democratic institutions at the national level and for the development of peace and cooperation at the international level (Diamond, 2019; Özbudun, 2018). When the theoretical framework is assessed as a whole, it becomes clearly evident that the separation of powers is not merely an element of national constitutional orders but also a structural variable shaping states'

international behavior, their credibility, and their contributions to global governance (Müftüler-Baç, 2023); this observation provides a sound conceptual foundation for the empirical analyses to be carried out in the subsequent sections of the study.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research offers an analysis examining the effects of the separation-of-powers system on countries' foreign policies, their position within international organizations, and their compliance with international law, together with their internal governance processes. In other words, this study aims to understand how the degree to which the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are independent of one another in a given country shapes that country's relations with other countries. Adopting a comparative analysis method, the study evaluates the manner in which the separation of powers is implemented in countries with different governance systems and its effect on foreign policy decision-making processes. Comparative analysis makes it possible to examine systematically the relationship between countries' governance systems and their foreign policy behavior (Lijphart, 1971). This approach, by setting out the institutional differences among various democratic systems and authoritarian regimes, allows for a clearer understanding of the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy. The fundamental reason for preferring the comparative analysis method is that an examination conducted through a single country would be unable to demonstrate adequately the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy; placing different countries side by side sets out this effect far more clearly (George & Bennett, 2005).

Taking into account that the separation-of-powers mechanism operates in different forms in democratic and authoritarian systems, this study discusses what kind of effect this system has on the dimensions of credibility and predictability in international relations. While the balance of powers and institutional autonomy in democratic systems ensure that foreign policy decisions are more transparent and accountable, the concentration of power in the executive in authoritarian systems leads to foreign policy decisions being taken within a more centralized and less supervised structure (Diamond, 2019). This can cause foreign policy decisions in authoritarian regimes to remain dependent on the will of a single person or a narrow group and thus lead to sudden and unpredictable changes in the international arena (Svolik, 2012). Examining the effects of these differences on foreign policy outcomes constitutes one of the study's fundamental focal points.

Qualitative analysis techniques were used in the research, and data were collected from the existing academic literature, official reports, international legal documents, foreign policy documents, and the assessments of international organizations. Qualitative analysis makes it possible to examine in depth the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes and to discover the different dimensions of this relationship (Silverman, 2020). Qualitative analysis is a method based on understanding and interpreting the content of written documents, reports, and official statements rather than numerical data; through this method, the rationales behind countries' foreign policy attitudes can be better grasped. In particular, using document analysis and content analysis techniques, the relationships among countries' constitutional arrangements, foreign policy strategies, and behavioral patterns in international relations were examined systematically.

In addition, the case study method was adopted in order to understand how the separation of powers is shaped in different governance systems. Case studies make it possible to test the theoretical framework with empirical data and to examine the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes through concrete examples (Yin, 2018). The selected cases were composed of countries representing different political systems, geographical regions, and levels of development, in an effort to increase the generalizability of the research results. The case study method is frequently preferred in the social sciences because it allows in-depth knowledge to be obtained regarding the research question; this method helps to understand the conditions and processes specific to each country beyond general rules (Gerring, 2016).

The methodological framework of the study was shaped along the axis of institutionalist theory, realist theory, and liberal international relations theory. These three theories are fundamental approaches that explain international relations from different angles, and each evaluates the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy through a separate lens. The separation of powers was evaluated within the institutionalist approach, which offers in-depth analyses of the functioning of institutions. This approach examines how institutional structures and constraints shape states' behavior and offers an important theoretical framework for understanding the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes (March & Olsen, 1989). The institutionalist perspective provides valuable insights, in particular, into the functioning of democratic institutions and how these institutions affect foreign policy decisions.

The dimensions of democratic accountability and transparency, for their part, were examined within the framework offered by liberal theory. Liberal theory holds that democratic institutions and values promote cooperation and peace in international relations and emphasizes the role of the separation of powers in this process (Moravcsik, 1997). Democratic peace theory, in particular, explains how democratic institutions and the separation of powers shape states' foreign policy behavior and demonstrates that democratic countries tend to establish more peaceful relations with one another (Doyle, 1986). This theoretical framework provides an important foundation for understanding the contribution of the separation of powers to international peace and stability. Russett and Oneal (2001) showed that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations are three elements that together foster peace; this finding is important for understanding why democratic countries possessing a separation of powers pursue more peaceful foreign policies.

In addition, realist perspectives were also brought into play, and the kind of advantage that separation-of-powers-based governments provide within the framework of power relations in the international arena was addressed. The realist approach emphasizes states' power- and national-interest-oriented behavior, yet it also acknowledges how domestic political structures and institutional constraints affect foreign policy decisions (Krasner, 1978). In this context, how the separation of powers affects states' capacity to achieve their foreign policy aims and how it shapes the international balance of power were examined. The realist perspective offers valuable insights, particularly into understanding the foreign policy behavior and security strategies of great powers. From the standpoint of neoclassical realism, Ripsman (2009) argued that domestic political institutions serve as a filter in the foreign policy-making process—that is, that international pressures are reflected in foreign policy not directly but through internal institutional structures. This perspective is highly illuminating for understanding the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy.

In the study, how the separation of powers shapes the relationship between the domestic legal order and international law was addressed in line with the norms of institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, the International Criminal Court, and the World Trade Organization. Examining the interaction between international and national legal systems contributes to understanding the role of the separation of powers in processes of compliance with international norms (Çelikel & Erdem, 2017). In this context, factors such as the processes of ratifying and implementing international agreements, the oversight capacity of the legislature, and the independence of judicial organs were examined in detail. Simmons (2009) showed that the level of compliance with international human rights agreements is directly connected to a country's internal institutional structure and that judicial independence plays a decisive role in this process.

It was emphasized that democratic countries exhibit greater compliance with the rules of international law, while in systems lacking a separation of powers arbitrary foreign policy practices are more widespread. Examining this relationship offers an important methodological approach for understanding the contribution of the separation of powers to international law and rules-based systems (Slaughter, 2000). In particular, the effect of the separation of powers on compliance with the rulings of international courts, the implementation of human rights conventions, and the fulfillment of international obligations was examined systematically. Hillebrecht (2014) showed that the level of compliance with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights is directly connected to the strength of the relevant countries' domestic legal mechanisms, and that countries with an independent judiciary implement court rulings more quickly and more fully.

In this study, secondary sources such as official state reports, documents published by international organizations, academic articles, books, and legal texts were used. Secondary sources are data and documents previously produced by other researchers or institutions; in this study, the examination of existing written sources was preferred over direct interviews or surveys. The systematic examination of secondary sources makes it possible to analyze the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes from a historical and comparative perspective (Bowen, 2009). The comprehensive review of the academic literature, in particular, contributed to the synthesis of the theoretical approaches and empirical findings related to the topic.

In addition, official documents related to foreign policy processes, constitutional arrangements, international legal texts, and studies on accountability mechanisms in international relations were included in the research. The examination of official documents and legal texts helped to understand the legal and institutional framework of the separation of powers and to identify the effects of this framework on foreign policy processes (Yanık, 2021). In particular, constitutional arrangements, legal regulations concerning the foreign policy powers of legislatures, and the ratification processes of international agreements were examined in detail. The examination of these documents is of great importance for understanding each country's implementation of the separation of powers within its own constitutional framework and for making cross-country comparisons (Vile, 1998).

Diplomatic documents and studies concerning international legal norms were also examined in the research; in particular, the reports of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and the World Bank's studies on governance were taken into account. The reports and assessments of international organizations make it possible to examine countries' levels of adherence to the separation of powers and the effects of this principle on foreign policy processes in an independent and comparative manner (Murswieck, 2019). These sources offer important data, particularly in assessing countries' levels of compliance with international norms and their diplomatic relations. Sources such as Freedom House (2023) reports and the World Bank's Governance Indicators set out countries' quality of democratic governance and their separation-of-powers practices with measurable data, thereby facilitating cross-country comparisons.

In this way, the extent to which countries possessing a separation-of-powers system comply with international norms was supported with concrete data. In the data collection process, sources from different disciplines and different theoretical perspectives were brought together in order to address the topic in a comprehensive and multidimensional manner. This approach made it possible to examine the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes from different angles and in different contexts. Bringing together different disciplines ensured that the topic was addressed not only from the perspective of political science or law but also with the contributions of fields such as economics and international relations.

Within the scope of the research, a comparative analysis was conducted across countries with different governance systems. The case analysis method makes it possible to examine complex social and political phenomena in depth and allows theoretical propositions to be tested with empirical data (George & Bennett, 2005). This method was used as an important methodological tool for understanding how the separation of powers is implemented in different political systems and how these implementations affect foreign policy processes. Case analysis aims to uncover the reasons behind general tendencies by taking into account each country's specific conditions and historical background; it is therefore widely used in comparative politics studies (Yin, 2018).

The selected countries were determined according to the following criteria:

- Countries where the separation-of-powers system is distinctly implemented (the United States, Germany, France, Canada)
- Countries with hybrid systems (Türkiye, Brazil, South Korea)
- Countries where separation-of-powers mechanisms are weak (Russia, China, Venezuela)

The countries in these three groups represent different governance systems around the world and show how foreign policy is shaped in cases where the separation of powers is strong, partially implemented, or weak. This classification makes it possible to examine comparatively the foreign policy behavior of countries in which the separation of powers is implemented at different levels (Çancı & Odabaş, 2016). In selecting the countries, care was taken to ensure that they represent different political systems, geographical regions, and levels of development, thereby seeking to increase the generalizability of the research findings. In line with Lijphart's (1971) principles of the comparative method, an approach was adopted in case selection that examines together both similar systems and systems that differ markedly from one another; this allows the effect of the separation-of-powers variable on foreign policy to be set out more clearly.

This comparative analysis made it possible to compare countries' levels of adherence to international law, their degrees of predictability in foreign policy, and their levels of cooperation with international organizations in line with the principle of the separation of powers (Montesquieu, 1748; Dahl, 1989). Comparative analysis, through similarities and differences, helped to set out more clearly the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes. The comparisons between democratic and authoritarian systems, in particular, offered valuable insights into understanding the importance of the separation of powers in international relations.

Within the scope of the case analyses, the functioning of the separation-of-powers mechanism in the foreign policy processes of the United States and Germany, the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy decision-making in Türkiye, and the consequences in international relations of the lack of a separation of powers in authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China were examined. For each country example, constitutional arrangements, institutional structures, foreign policy decision-making processes, and behavioral patterns in international relations were analyzed systematically. These analyses made it possible to examine the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes through concrete examples.

In the case of the United States, the balance between the legislature and the executive within the presidential system, Congress's powers in foreign policy, and the oversight role of the federal courts were examined. The fact that, in the United States, the president needs Congress's approval in many cases in order to take foreign policy

decisions makes this country a more predictable actor in the international arena. In the case of Germany, foreign policy-making processes within the parliamentary system, the role of the Federal Constitutional Court, and the effect of coalition governments on foreign policy decisions were evaluated. In Germany, the existence of coalition governments requires foreign policy decisions to be taken through the consensus of more than one party, which makes the decision-making process more participatory (Harnisch & Wagener, 2009). In the case of Türkiye, the changes in foreign policy decision-making processes and the transformations in the balance of the separation of powers brought about by the transition from the parliamentary system to the Presidential Government System were examined. This fundamental system change in Türkiye constitutes a particularly valuable example for observing the effect of the separation of powers on foreign policy, since it offers the opportunity to compare the foreign policy outcomes of two different governance models implemented in the same country in different periods (Özcan, 2017).

In the study, how international legal mechanisms are related to the separation of powers was assessed, and the advantages of the separation of powers in terms of international organizations and multilateral diplomacy processes were addressed. The analyses conducted from the perspective of international law and organizations contributed to understanding how the separation of powers affects states' positions and behavior in the international system (Toluner, 2017). In particular, the role of the separation of powers in the processes of ratifying, implementing, and supervising international agreements was examined in detail. For an international agreement to be implementable in domestic law, the approval of the legislature is required in most democratic countries; this demonstrates the direct effect of the separation of powers on the process of compliance with international law.

In the context of relations with institutions such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, NATO, the World Trade Organization, and the International Criminal Court, the effects of the separation of powers on international cooperation were scrutinized. The importance that international organizations attach to democratic values and to the separation of powers, these organizations' expectations of member states, and their mechanisms for preserving democratic standards were analyzed in detail. These analyses contributed to understanding the importance of the separation of powers in terms of international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. NATO, for example, assesses in its membership processes the extent to which candidate countries implement democratic governance standards and the separation of powers; this shows that the separation of powers is a determining criterion not only in domestic politics but also in participation in international organizations (Reiter, 2001).

These analyses offer important data for understanding how systems grounded in the principle of the rule of law direct states' foreign policies. In particular, the advantages provided by the separation-of-powers mechanism were set out in the context of the implementation of international agreements, compliance with human rights norms, and the accountability of foreign policy processes. With respect to compliance with international law and norms, the protective and supporting role of the separation of powers in democratic systems was examined through concrete examples.

The democratic standards that the European Union expects of candidate countries in its enlargement process, the United Nations' policies on human rights and the rule of law, and the World Trade Organization's mechanisms for resolving trade disputes were evaluated as the repercussions of the separation of powers within international organizations. These examinations contributed to understanding the importance of the separation of powers in terms of international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy (Risse-Kappen, 1995). Schimmelfennig (2007) showed that, in the European Union's enlargement process in Eastern Europe, the policy of democratic conditionality was a driving force in candidate countries' strengthening of their separation-of-powers mechanisms; this finding sets out the capacity of international organizations to shape internal institutional structures.

The separation of powers contributes to states' conduct of an accountable and transparent foreign policy in the international arena. Thanks to democratic oversight mechanisms, foreign policy decisions are shaped on the basis of broader social consensus by passing through the oversight of legislatures and an independent judiciary (Rodrik, 2011). In other words, in countries possessing a separation of powers, foreign policy decisions are taken not from a single center but by passing through the oversight and approval processes of different institutions; this increases the likelihood that decisions reflect society as a whole. In this context, examining the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy decision-making processes constitutes one of the study's fundamental focal points.

The theoretical approaches used in foreign policy analysis examine, in particular, how domestic political factors and institutional structures affect foreign policy decisions and emphasize the role of the separation of powers in this process (Hill, 2016). Approaches such as Robert Putnam's "two-level game" theory and Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics model demonstrate that foreign policy decisions are affected by both domestic political

processes and international factors, and they emphasize the role of the separation of powers in this interaction (Putnam, 1988; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). According to Putnam's two-level game theory, a country's government negotiates simultaneously both with its own parliament and public opinion in domestic politics and with other countries in foreign policy; the separation of powers directly affects the balance between these two levels.

In the study, it was emphasized that governments possessing a separation of powers offer greater stability in foreign policy and strengthen international security. In this context, it was observed that in countries with legislative oversight, foreign policy decisions rest on a sounder legal and ethical framework. The capacity of legislatures to oversee foreign policy decisions prevents the executive from taking unilateral and risk-laden decisions; this in turn increases predictability and stability in international relations (İşeri & Dilek, 2019). Kaarbo (2015) emphasized the decisive effect of domestic political processes on foreign policy and showed that the legislature's power of foreign policy oversight directly increases countries' international credibility.

The role of the separation of powers in international crisis situations was addressed as a particularly notable research topic. In crisis management processes, the institutional balance and oversight mechanisms in democratic systems contribute to the prevention of extreme reactions and to a greater preference for diplomatic means of resolution (Lebow, 1981). This can prevent the escalation of international crises and facilitate the finding of peaceful solutions (Kelman, 2007). In countries with a strong separation of powers, the executive cannot take a decision for war or initiate a military intervention on its own in a moment of crisis; since the approval of the legislature is required, decisions are taken more carefully and in a more measured manner. This increases the likelihood that crises will be resolved by peaceful means.

In this study, only institutional mechanisms at the state level were examined, and topics such as the effect of civil society on foreign policy and the role of the media were not directly addressed. This limitation, which defines the scope of the research, made it possible to focus on the role of state institutions and official mechanisms in foreign policy processes, but it restricted the detailed examination of the effect of non-state actors such as civil society and the media. In future studies, examining the effects of civil society organizations and the media on the separation of powers and foreign policy processes may contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the topic. Diamond (1994) emphasized that civil society and an independent media complement the separation-of-powers mechanism as a "fourth power"; therefore, the exclusion of these actors partially limits the research's ability to offer a holistic picture.

In addition, the study did not focus on long-term historical analyses of how international organizations are shaped by the separation of powers, but rather took the current period as its basis. The study's time constraint required a focus on current developments and present situations and limited the detailed examination of historical processes and evolutions. A more detailed examination of the historical perspective may contribute to understanding the change over time in the role of the separation of powers in international relations. Huntington (1991) showed that democratization processes occur in historical waves; therefore, the evolution of the separation of powers should be examined not only with current data but also through long-term historical analyses; however, the scope of this study could not fully encompass such historical depth.

Another limitation of the study is the limited use of quantitative data and its predominant reliance on qualitative analyses. The absence of quantitative indicators that could be used in measuring the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes affected the methodological approach of the research. In future studies, more quantitative indicators and statistical analyses may be used to measure the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy outcomes, so that qualitative findings can be supported with quantitative data. The use of quantitative methods may, for example, make it possible to measure numerically the relationship between countries' democratic governance scores and their rates of compliance with international agreements; such an analysis could provide strong support for the qualitative findings.

Finally, the study's language constraints should also be taken into account. The study used predominantly English- and Turkish-language sources; the limited evaluation of sources in other languages may have caused some regional perspectives and examples to be insufficiently examined. A more comprehensive examination of sources in different languages may contribute to a better understanding of the implementations of the separation of powers in different cultural and political contexts. In particular, the examination of academic sources in languages such as German, French, Spanish, and Arabic may offer a broader perspective on how the separation of powers is perceived and implemented in regions outside Western Europe.

This study, by setting out the importance of the separation-of-powers system in foreign policy and in international legal mechanisms, analyzes how states can become more stable and reliable actors in their external relations. The theoretical and empirical findings offered by the study make important contributions to understanding the kind of effect that separation-of-powers-based governance models create in the international system. In particular, the systematic examination of the effects of the separation of powers on states' foreign policy behavior, their compliance with international law, and their capacities for global cooperation fills an important gap in the literature.

The methodological framework of the study, by bringing together different theoretical approaches, makes it possible to address the topic in a comprehensive and multidimensional manner. The synthesis of institutionalist, liberal, and realist perspectives contributes to evaluating the role of the separation of powers in international relations from different angles and to developing a more holistic understanding (Özcan, 2017). This approach demonstrates that the separation of powers is not merely a matter of domestic politics but also an important factor shaping states' international behavior. The combined use of different theoretical perspectives ensured that the topic was not confined to a single point of view and contributed to placing the research results on a more reliable footing.

The case analyses and comparative examinations contribute to understanding how the separation of powers is implemented in different political systems and how these implementations affect foreign policy outcomes (Gerring, 2016). The comparisons between democratic and authoritarian systems, in particular, demonstrate the importance of the separation of powers in international relations through concrete examples and make it possible to test theoretical propositions with empirical data. These comparisons help to understand more clearly the effects of the separation of powers on foreign policy processes.

Another contribution of the study is its emphasis on the importance of the separation of powers in terms of global governance and international cooperation. In particular, understanding the role of democratic institutions and the separation of powers in the increasing interdependence of the globalization process and in resolving transboundary problems may contribute to the development of more effective and legitimate global governance structures. In this context, the study sets out the role of the separation of powers in strengthening democratic governance not only at the national level but also at the global level. Kahler (2016) argued that the effectiveness of global governance structures is directly connected to the internal institutional quality of member states; this finding shows that countries possessing a separation of powers can make more constructive contributions to global governance processes.

In conclusion, this research, by comprehensively examining the effects of the separation of powers on states' foreign policy behavior and their position in the international system, makes important contributions to the literature. The strengths of the methodological approach lie in its allowing the different dimensions of the topic and different theoretical perspectives to be evaluated together, while its limitations lie in its restricting the more in-depth examination of certain dimensions. In future studies, overcoming these limitations and examining the topic more comprehensively may contribute to a better understanding of the role of the separation of powers in international relations. The methodological choices and limitations explained in this section transparently set out the research's strengths as well as the areas in need of improvement; this is important for the reliability of scientific studies (Silverman, 2020).

5. FINDINGS

The separation of powers plays a critical role in ensuring stability in democratic states and in freeing governance from arbitrariness. The independent action of the legislative, executive, and judicial organs preserves the rule of law and forestalls authoritarian tendencies (Dahl, 1989). In this context, the separation of powers encompasses not only the functional division of state organs but also the institutional safeguarding of the mechanisms of mutual checks and balances among these organs (Lijphart, 2012). In the democratic countries examined within the scope of the research, it was observed that the effective implementation of the separation of powers increases domestic political stability and that this stability is also positively reflected in foreign policy processes (Diamond, 2019). Particularly in established democracies such as the United States, Germany, France, and Canada, the strength of separation-of-powers mechanisms ensures that foreign policy decisions are taken within a broader framework of consensus, which in turn increases credibility and predictability in international relations (Lijphart, 2012). Indeed, Russett and Oneal (2001) showed with empirical evidence that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations together form a "Kantian triangle" that supports peace, and the effectiveness of democratic institutions—one of the fundamental legs of this triangle—is directly dependent on the sound functioning of separation-of-powers mechanisms.

The sound functioning of separation-of-powers mechanisms in democratic governments, by ensuring that governments act within a framework of social consensus, creates consistency in the state's domestic and foreign policies (Habermas, 1996). The examinations conducted found that in countries where legislatures can effectively oversee foreign policy decisions, these decisions are shaped as a result of more comprehensive deliberation and social support is higher (Risse-Kappen, 1991). This finding also coincides with Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory; for in democratic systems with strong legislative oversight, governments, having to satisfy both the approval of parliament in domestic politics and the expectations of negotiating partners at the international level, base their foreign policy decisions on a broader foundation of legitimacy. For example, the strong oversight power of the German parliament (the Bundestag) in matters of foreign and defense policy makes it imperative for the government's decisions in these areas to pass through parliamentary processes, which ensures that Germany's international commitments also receive broad support in domestic politics (Oppermann & Brummer, 2014). Similarly, in their quantitative analyses testing the democratic peace hypothesis, Maoz and Russett (1993) showed that institutional constraints grounded in the separation of powers are as decisive as normative factors in lowering the probability of interstate conflict; this finding confirms the structural importance of parliamentary oversight in foreign policy.

One of the most important effects of the separation of powers in democratic systems is that it increases the accountability of the government. The independence of the judiciary limits the arbitrary practices of the executive and makes it imperative for political decisions to rest on legal foundations (Rodrik, 2007). In this framework, judicial independence not only ensures legal certainty at the national level but also directly affects states' capacity to fulfill their international commitments (Simmons, 2009). The case analyses conducted within the scope of the research set out that in countries with strong judicial independence, the state exhibits greater compliance with international legal norms and implements the rulings of international courts more effectively (Akay, 2018). For example, with regard to the implementation of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a higher rate of compliance is observed in countries with a strong separation of powers (Çalı et al., 2011). In his study examining the level of compliance with ECtHR rulings, Hillebrecht (2014) showed with empirical evidence that the rate of implementation of these rulings remains above 80% in democratic countries with strong judicial independence, whereas this rate falls below 50% in countries with weak judicial independence; this finding renders concrete the decisive role of separation-of-powers mechanisms in the effectiveness of international judicial rulings.

States possessing a democratic separation-of-powers system exhibit greater compliance with international law. In these countries, because foreign policy decisions can be overseen by the legislative and judicial organs, the likelihood that states will violate their international obligations is lower (Donnelly, 2003). In her empirical study examining the levels of compliance of states party to international human rights agreements, Hathaway (2002) showed that separation-of-powers mechanisms—particularly independent judicial organs—play a decisive role in transposing international commitments into domestic law. The statistics on compliance with international agreements examined within the scope of the research show that the rate of adherence to international commitments is higher in countries with a strong separation of powers (Simmons, 2009). The level of compliance of democratic countries is higher, particularly in human rights conventions, environmental agreements, and international agreements on disarmament. In this context, in her comprehensive study *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, Simmons (2009) showed with empirical evidence that independent judicial organs and legislative oversight play a decisive role in the domestic incorporation of international human rights norms, finding that the level of implementation of these norms is significantly higher in states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms.

In European Union (EU) member states, for example, the strength of the separation-of-powers mechanism accelerates the process of compliance with EU legal norms (Keohane & Nye, 2001). The rule-of-law principle, one of the EU's fundamental values, requires the effective implementation of the separation of powers in member states' institutional structures, which facilitates the integration of EU law into domestic law (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) analyzed the effectiveness of the EU's conditionality mechanism in promoting separation-of-powers reforms in candidate countries, but also showed that the weakening of this conditionality in the post-accession period paved the way for the erosion of the separation of powers in some member states. The Rule of Law Reports regularly published by the European Commission assess the state of the separation of powers and compliance with EU norms in member states, and these reports show that compliance with EU law also declines in countries where the separation of powers has weakened (Pech & Scheppele, 2017). Indeed, as seen in the cases of Poland and Hungary, interventions against judicial independence triggered the EU's rule-of-law mechanism and budget cuts for these countries came onto the agenda; this development concretely sets out how indispensable the separation of powers is for EU integration (Kelemen, 2020).

In regimes that are not grounded in the separation of powers or where it is weak, on the other hand, it is observed that states are more reluctant to comply with international law. In countries where the executive is not overseen or where the legislature and judiciary are under the control of the executive, the violation of international law is a widespread occurrence (Fukuyama, 2014). In the authoritarian regimes examined within the scope of the research, it was found that cases in which international agreements are not implemented despite being ratified, or are implemented selectively, are more frequent (Simmons, 2009). In his comprehensive study analyzing authoritarian governance dynamics, Svoboda (2012) showed that the structural absence of power-sharing and oversight mechanisms in authoritarian regimes causes levels of commitment to international obligations to remain structurally low; this finding confirms the indispensability of the separation of powers for compliance with international law. This demonstrates that the separation-of-powers system increases a state's capacity to fulfill its international obligations (Habermas, 1996).

A similar tendency is observed with regard to compliance with the rulings of international courts. In countries with a strong separation of powers, the rate of compliance with the rulings of institutions such as the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International Criminal Court is higher (Hillebrecht, 2014). Within the framework of the "spiral model" examining the process of the domestic internalization of international norms, Risse (2000) argued that separation-of-powers mechanisms—particularly an independent judiciary and civil society—function as a critical "domestic pressure mechanism" in embedding international human rights norms in state practice. This shows that in countries where judicial independence and the rule of law are adopted in domestic politics, the rulings of international courts also command greater respect (Başlar, 2019). In democratic systems in particular, the integration of international court rulings into the national legal system takes place more easily, and the legal and institutional arrangements necessary for implementing these rulings can be made more rapidly. In this framework, Slaughter (1995) set out that there is a direct positive correlation between democratic states' domestic legal structures and their levels of compliance with international law, emphasizing that separation-of-powers-based forms of government in particular provide an institutional infrastructure that facilitates the national-level implementation of international judicial rulings.

The separation of powers ensures that more rational decisions are taken in foreign policy-making processes by balancing the powers of the executive. The power of legislatures to approve foreign policy decisions prevents the executive from taking hasty and unilateral decisions, thereby creating stability in international relations (Nye, 2008). Kaarbo (2015) emphasized the decisive effect of domestic political processes on foreign policy and showed that the legislature's power of foreign policy oversight directly increases countries' international credibility; this observation renders concrete the structural effect of separation-of-powers mechanisms on foreign policy outputs. In the democratic countries examined within the scope of the research, the passage of foreign policy decisions through legislative oversight allows these decisions to be assessed more comprehensively and possible risks to be identified in advance (Ripsman, 2009). This enables democratic countries to behave more cautiously in foreign policy and to respond more measuredly to international crises. In their classic study applying the bureaucratic politics model to foreign policy analysis, Allison and Zelikow (1999) emphasized that the separation-of-powers system enables the production of more balanced foreign policy outputs through the competition and accommodation of different institutional actors, and that this pluralistic decision-making process serves a critical function, especially in times of crisis, in preventing unilateral and hasty decisions.

In the United States, for example, the powers that Congress holds over foreign policy decisions limit the president's ability to take decisions alone and ensure that the executive is accountable in international agreements (Mearsheimer, 2001). The power to declare war, the power to ratify international agreements, and the power to control foreign aid programs that the Constitution grants to Congress make it imperative for U.S. foreign policy to pass through legislative oversight, which allows foreign policy decisions to be shaped as a result of more comprehensive deliberation (Lindsay, 1994). In their study examining the effect of parliaments on foreign policy, Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) set out that the legislature's power of approval, by limiting the executive's room for maneuver, contributes to the production of a more accountable and predictable foreign policy. Similarly, in parliamentary democracies such as Germany and France, the taking of foreign policy decisions through deliberation by legislatures increases long-term stability and international trust (Kaarbo, 2015).

Conversely, in regimes where the separation of powers is not operative, foreign policy decisions are generally shaped on the basis of personal and arbitrary preferences. In the authoritarian regimes examined within the scope of the research, it was observed that foreign policy decisions are generally taken by a narrow elite group and that these decisions are far from accountable to public opinion (Geddes, 2003). In his study examining the foreign policy decision-making processes of authoritarian regimes, Geddes (2003) showed with empirical evidence that the taking of foreign policy decisions by a narrow elite group in these regimes leads to strategic inconsistencies and sudden policy changes owing to the absence of mechanisms of accountability to public opinion. In countries

such as Russia and China, for example, foreign policy decisions are taken by a narrow circle formed around strong leaders, which can lead to sudden changes and inconsistencies in foreign policy (Lo, 2015).

Examinations conducted specifically on Türkiye show that the increase in the executive's powers in the field of foreign policy with the transition to the Presidential Government System has led to foreign policy decisions being taken in a more centralized manner (Duran, 2018). This has caused a decrease in the oversight role of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye in foreign policy decisions and the assumption of a more personalized structure by foreign policy (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017). This transformation has paved the way for the weakening of an institutional continuity in Türkiye's foreign policy independent of changes of government and for the basing of foreign policy decisions on shorter-term calculations (Kalaycıoğlu, 2018). This transformation in Türkiye's foreign policy constitutes an important example of how the weakening of the separation of powers can affect foreign policy processes.

The separation of powers contributes to a country's being perceived as a reliable actor in foreign policy. Foreign policy processes grounded in democratic mechanisms are found to be more predictable by other states and international institutions and make cooperation with these states more attractive (Fukuyama, 2014). This predictability is directly related not only to the passage of foreign policy decisions through institutional processes but also to the placement of these decisions within a legal framework through legislative oversight and judicial control mechanisms (Keohane, 2005). The examinations conducted within the scope of the research show that democratic countries behave more consistently in foreign policy and remain more faithful to their international commitments (Martin, A. T., 2020). This strengthens the element of trust in these countries' diplomatic relations and increases their capacity to establish long-term cooperation. In his study examining the effect of democratic institutions on foreign policy credibility, Martin (2020) showed with empirical evidence that the levels of adherence to international agreements of states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms are structurally higher, and that this reinforces the perception of credibility in the eyes of other states.

Countries that strongly implement the separation of powers, such as Germany and Canada, for example, conduct a foreign policy grounded in longer-term strategies in international relations. The foreign policies of these countries are less affected by changes of government, which increases credibility in the international arena (Moravcsik, 2013). Germany's European Union policy and Canada's multilateral diplomacy approach remain largely stable despite changes of government, which ensures that these countries are seen as reliable partners in the international arena (Nye, 2011). This institutional continuity stems from the fact that separation-of-powers mechanisms confer an embedded "institutional memory" on foreign policy processes; in his transgovernmental relations approach, Risse-Kappen (1995) emphasized that democratic institutions directly determine continuity and consistency in foreign policy.

In countries where the executive is the sole determinant in foreign policy, by contrast, policy changes can be sudden and unpredictable. In the authoritarian regimes examined within the scope of the research, it was observed that foreign policy decisions depend on the leader's personal preferences and that this creates uncertainty in international relations (Way, 2015). The foreign policies of these countries can undergo major transformations with changes of leader or changes in the leader's preferences, which weakens credibility in the international arena (Hale, 2019). Svolik (2012) showed that the structural absence of power-sharing and institutional oversight mechanisms in authoritarian regimes increases the propensity for risk-taking in foreign policy and that these regimes' levels of commitment to their international obligations remain structurally low; this finding demonstrates that authoritarian governments possess an inherent vulnerability in terms of international credibility.

Examinations conducted specifically on Türkiye demonstrate the effect of the separation of powers on credibility and stability in foreign policy. The changes in Türkiye's foreign policy follow a course parallel to the transformations in the balance of the separation of powers (Kıbrıs & Metternich, 2016). In particular, the strengthening of the executive and the taking of foreign policy decisions in a more centralized manner in recent years have led to certain sudden changes and inconsistencies in Türkiye's foreign policy, which has created credibility problems in international relations (Aydın, 2017). In their study examining Türkiye's relations with the European Union, Aydın-Düzgün and Tocci (2015) showed that the transformations in the balance of the separation of powers directly affected Türkiye's EU accession process and that diplomatic credibility weakened markedly in periods of democratic backsliding. This example emphasizes the importance of the separation of powers in terms of stability and credibility in foreign policy. In his study examining the transformation of institutional actors and decision-making mechanisms in Türkiye's foreign policy, Köse (2020) found that the expansion of the executive's powers in the field of foreign policy led to the weakening of institutional pluralism and to foreign policy decisions being shaped by a narrow cadre; this negatively affects institutional continuity and predictability in foreign policy.

In the separation-of-powers system, an independent judiciary serves a critical function in ensuring the mechanism of legal conformity in foreign policy. Particularly in matters such as the implementation of international agreements and human rights violations, independent judicial organs ensure the oversight of the executive (Rodrik, 2007). This oversight function is not confined to the protection of legal guarantees at the national level alone but also encompasses the guaranteeing, through an institutional mechanism, of states' compliance with international legal norms and treaty obligations (Nollkaemper, 2011). The examinations conducted within the scope of the research show that in countries with strong judicial independence, international legal norms are integrated into domestic law more effectively and the rulings of international courts are implemented more consistently (Nollkaemper, 2011). In their study examining the relationship between international law and domestic law, Slaughter and Burke-White (2006) emphasized that the capacity of independent judicial organs to implement international legal norms at the national level is directly affected by the effectiveness of the separation of powers.

Cooperation with international judicial bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is conducted more effectively in countries with a strong separation of powers (Dahl, 1989). The statistics on compliance with ECtHR rulings show that these rulings are implemented at a higher rate in countries with strong judicial independence (Çalı & Bruch, 2017). For example, while the rate of implementation of ECtHR rulings is above 80% in democratic countries with strong judicial independence, such as the Scandinavian countries and Germany, this rate can fall below 50% in countries with weak judicial independence (Hillebrecht, 2014). These quantitative data concretely set out that separation-of-powers mechanisms are a fundamental variable determining the effectiveness of international judicial rulings not only at the theoretical level but also at the empirical level; indeed, Hillebrecht (2014) showed through comprehensive statistical analyses that compliance with ECtHR rulings follows a course directly proportional to judicial independence.

In countries lacking an independent judicial system, on the other hand, adherence to international law weakens, and this shakes states' credibility in foreign policy. In systems where the judiciary is under the control of the executive, the implementation of international legal norms and court rulings is generally shaped according to political interests, which weakens the rule-of-law principle (Basedow & Basedow, 2021). Indeed, in countries such as Russia and China, the selective implementation or complete disregard of the rulings of international courts reflects the structural weakness of these countries' adherence to international law; this stems directly from the absence or dysfunction of separation-of-powers mechanisms (Lo, 2015). The impunity of human rights violations, in particular, damages the reputation of these states in the eyes of the international community (Keohane, 2005). In his comprehensive study examining the relationship between human rights and international politics, Donnelly (2013) emphasized that the impunity of human rights violations in countries with weak judicial independence paves the way for these states to be drawn into diplomatic isolation in the international community and to be excluded from multilateral cooperation mechanisms.

In the case of Türkiye, the relationship between the state of judicial independence and the level of compliance with ECtHR rulings is notable. While in periods when judicial independence was relatively stronger Türkiye's rate of compliance with ECtHR rulings was higher, this rate declined in periods when judicial independence weakened (Çalı, 2018). In his study examining the relationship between the separation of powers and judicial independence in Türkiye, Kalaycıoğlu (2020) set out that the process of the erosion of judicial independence temporally coincided with the decline in the level of compliance with ECtHR rulings, and that this directly affected Türkiye's legal credibility in the eyes of the Council of Europe. This demonstrates how critical judicial independence is in terms of compliance with international law and credibility in foreign policy (Gemalmaz, 2019). In his study assessing Türkiye's performance of compliance with international human rights conventions, Gemalmaz (2019) found that the positive correlation between judicial independence and compliance with international law is concretely observed in the case of Türkiye, and that the transformations in the balance of the separation of powers directly affect adherence to international human rights standards.

The separation of powers imposes on the executive the obligation to act within a legal and institutional framework in crisis management processes. This, by forestalling excessive reactions in foreign policy, ensures the more effective management of international crises (Mearsheimer, 2001). This institutional framework, by making it imperative for the decisions taken by the executive in a moment of crisis to pass through legislative oversight and judicial control, reduces the risk of escalation of international crises at the structural level (Fearon, 1994). In the international crises examined within the scope of the research, it was observed that democratic countries behaved more cautiously and more frequently preferred diplomatic means of resolution (Fearon, 1994). Particularly in multilateral diplomacy processes, countries possessing a separation-of-powers system can develop more stable negotiating positions (Nye, 2008). In their comprehensive study systematically examining international crises, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) showed with empirical evidence that democratic states with strong separation-of-

powers mechanisms behave more cautiously in crisis situations, give greater priority to diplomatic solutions, and that the probability of crisis escalation is significantly lower in these states.

In democratic systems, legislative oversight in crisis management processes, by preventing the executive from taking sudden and unpredictable decisions, ensures that more balanced and measured responses are given (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). In the United States, for example, laws aimed at limiting Congress's war powers make the president's use of military force conditional on certain requirements and render legislative oversight imperative (Scheppele, 2018). This contributes to the prevention of extreme reactions in crisis situations and to a greater preference for diplomatic means of resolution. In this context, Born (2003) emphasized that the obtaining of parliamentary approval, particularly in critical matters such as military intervention and defense expenditures, ensures that these decisions both receive broader support in domestic politics and gain greater international legitimacy; in Western European countries, the subjection of military intervention decisions to parliamentary approval allows the potential risks of these decisions to be assessed more carefully.

In systems where the separation of powers is weak, on the other hand, crisis management is generally subject to fewer institutional constraints, which can lead to riskier and more unpredictable reactions (Svolik, 2012). In authoritarian regimes, the leader's personal decisions and the assessments of a narrow circle of elites are decisive in crisis management, and the absence of democratic oversight mechanisms makes it difficult to prevent excessive reactions and strategic errors (Geddes et al., 2018). Russia's intervention in Ukraine, for example, was carried out as a result of decisions taken by a narrow circle without passing through a process of democratic deliberation and oversight, which led to international reactions and comprehensive sanctions (Hill & Gaddy, 2015); this case concretely demonstrates how the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms can lead to destructive consequences in crisis management. This can cause the escalation of international crises and an increase in the risk of conflict.

An important example regarding the role of the separation of powers in crisis management is the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the management of this crisis, U.S. President Kennedy's consultation with the National Security Council and some key members of Congress allowed different views to be assessed and a more balanced response to be developed (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis within the framework of the bureaucratic politics model, Allison and Zelikow (1999) set out that the inclusion of different institutional actors in the decision-making process played a decisive role in preventing the option of unilateral military intervention and in giving priority to diplomacy; this example renders concrete the vital importance of the institutional pluralism that the separation-of-powers system provides in times of crisis. This example demonstrates the importance of institutional consultation and oversight mechanisms in crisis management in democratic systems (Kurtbağ, 2017). In the case of Türkiye, for its part, Karaosmanoğlu (2020) found that, with the weakening of the separation of powers, the decrease in parliamentary oversight regarding cross-border operations and military interventions led to these decisions being taken in a more centralized manner and created certain problems with regard to international legitimacy and support.

The separation of powers also provides important advantages in international economic relations. In systems grounded in the rule of law and the separation of powers, the greater predictability of economic decisions creates an environment of trust for foreign investors (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012). In his work *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, North (1990) argued that political systems grounded in the separation of powers lower transaction costs by providing the guarantee of property rights and make it easier for economic actors to make long-term investment decisions; this mechanism also ensures that states are perceived as reliable partners in international economic relations. The foreign direct investment data examined within the scope of the research show that countries with a strong separation of powers are more successful in attracting foreign capital (Büthe & Milner, 2008). In their study examining the effect of international trade agreements on investment flows, Büthe and Milner (2008) supported with empirical evidence that the conformity of countries with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms with international economic rules increases investor confidence and that these countries' capacity to attract foreign direct investment is significantly higher.

In countries with strong democratic institutions and a strong separation of powers, the protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and the stability of economic policies are more secure, which positively affects international trade and investment relations (North, 1990). In the World Bank's *Ease of Doing Business* index, for example, countries with strong democratic institutions generally rank higher (Pamuk, 2018). This shows that the separation of powers is also important in terms of economic development and prosperity. In their work *Why Nations Fail*, Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) showed with comprehensive historical data that inclusive institutions grounded in the separation of powers constitute the foundation of sustainable economic growth and

prosperity, and that the limitation of the executive and the existence of institutional oversight mechanisms make it possible to ensure fairness in the distribution of resources and to support innovative activities.

The separation of powers also plays an important role in the implementation of international trade agreements. In democratic systems, the approval of trade agreements by the legislature and their oversight by judicial organs ensures the more effective implementation of these agreements (Rodrik, 2018). Rodrik (2007) emphasized that the existence of democratic institutions and the separation of powers provides important guarantees in terms of the protection of property rights, judicial independence, and the stability of economic policies, and that these guarantees are a determining factor for international trade partners and foreign investors. Statistics on the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism set out that countries with a strong separation of powers exhibit greater compliance with WTO rulings (Davis, 2012). In his study examining the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, Shaffer (2019) found that democratic countries' willingness to comply with the rulings of this mechanism stems from the fact that their separation-of-powers-based institutional structures facilitate the implementation of international obligations in domestic law.

Examinations conducted specifically on Türkiye demonstrate the effect of the separation of powers on economic relations. Türkiye's economic performance and its capacity to attract foreign investment show parallels with the changes in the rule-of-law and separation-of-powers indices (Acemoğlu & Üçer, 2021). In particular, the weakening of judicial independence and the taking of economic decisions in a more centralized manner negatively affect the confidence of foreign investors and increase the risk of economic instability (Yılmaz, 2021). In his study examining Türkiye's economic development process, Pamuk (2018) set out that the strengthening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers is of critical importance for ensuring sustainable development, and that, in particular, the weakening of central bank independence and the centralization of economic decision-making processes led to the lowering of Türkiye's credit ratings and a decrease in its capacity to attract foreign capital. This once again emphasizes the importance of the separation of powers in terms of economic development and international economic integration. In their study examining Türkiye's position as an emerging middle power in regional and global governance, Öniş and Kutlay (2017) found that the tendency toward centralization in economic decision-making processes and the decrease in the effectiveness of independent institutions negatively affected Türkiye's international economic credibility and its contribution to global economic governance.

The separation of powers plays an important role in the shaping and implementation of international security policies. In democratic systems, the subjection of security policies to legislative and judicial oversight ensures that these policies are more transparent and accountable (Feaver, 2003). This transparency and accountability directly contributes not only to the strengthening of legitimacy in domestic politics but also to the reinforcement of the trust that allies feel toward one another in international security cooperation (Born, 2003). The data examined within the scope of the research show that countries with a strong separation of powers participate more actively in international security cooperation and contribute more substantially to collective security mechanisms (Levy, 2011). In their study examining the effect of democratic institutions on security policies, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) set out with empirical evidence that states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms can develop more measured and strategic responses to international security threats, and that this directly increases the effectiveness of collective security arrangements.

Security organizations such as NATO regard member countries' commitment to democratic values and the separation of powers as a fundamental membership condition. NATO's founding principles, which emphasize democratic values, envisage the conformity of member countries' internal governance structures with democratic standards (Yalınkılıçlı, 2016). This emphasizes the importance of the separation of powers in the international security architecture. In NATO's enlargement process, the strengthening of candidate countries' democratic institutions and separation-of-powers mechanisms was set as a precondition, and the membership processes of countries that did not meet these conditions slowed down or stopped (Schimmelfennig, 2007). In his study examining NATO's enlargement process, Schimmelfennig (2007) showed that the policy of democratic conditionality was a driving force in candidate countries' strengthening of their separation-of-powers mechanisms; this finding concretely sets out the capacity of international security organizations to shape internal institutional structures.

In democratic systems, the parliamentary oversight of defense and security policies ensures that these policies are more transparent and legitimate (Born, 2003). The powers of legislatures to approve defense budgets, oversee military operations, and review security strategies limit the executive's room for maneuver in the field of security, which contributes to the conduct of security policies in a more balanced and responsible manner (Karaosmanoğlu, 2015). In his study examining the effect of civil-military relations on security policies, Feaver (2003) emphasized that separation-of-powers mechanisms, by keeping the armed forces under civilian oversight, strengthen the

democratic legitimacy of security policies, and that this serves a decisive function in establishing trust among allies. In Germany, for example, the power of the Federal Parliament (the Bundestag) to approve the armed forces' operations abroad strengthens the democratic oversight of German security policy and increases the social legitimacy of these policies (Harnisch & Wagener, 2009). In their study examining Germany's foreign policy decision-making processes, Oppermann and Brummer (2014) found that, although the Bundestag's strong oversight power slows Germany's participation in international security operations, it ensures that this participation rests on broad social support in domestic politics, thereby reinforcing international credibility in the long term.

In systems where the separation of powers is weak, on the other hand, security policies are generally less transparent and accountable, which can pose a risk in terms of international security (Desch, 1999). In authoritarian regimes, security policies are mostly determined by a narrow elite group and kept away from democratic oversight (Gause, 2011). Geddes (2003) showed that the determination of security policies behind closed doors and away from democratic oversight in authoritarian regimes causes the social support for these policies to remain weak and leads to legitimacy problems in the international arena. This can cause these countries' security policies to be unpredictable and lead to problems of trust in international security cooperation. In his study examining the relationship between threat perception and security strategies, Karaosmanoğlu (2019) found that the shaping of security policies away from public deliberation and institutional oversight in countries with weak separation-of-powers mechanisms causes these countries' threat perceptions to be confined to a narrow perspective and leads them to display unpredictable behavior in international security cooperation.

In critical matters such as military intervention and defense expenditures in particular, the obtaining of parliamentary approval ensures that these decisions receive broader support in domestic politics and gain greater international legitimacy (Born, 2003). In Western European countries, for example, the subjection of military intervention decisions to parliamentary approval allows these decisions to be assessed more carefully and potential risks to be better analyzed. This parliamentary oversight mechanism also constitutes one of the fundamental premises of democratic peace theory; Doyle (1986) emphasized that democratic institutions and the separation of powers limit aggressive and expansionist tendencies in states' foreign policies and encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In systems where the separation of powers is weak, by contrast, security policies are generally determined behind closed doors and away from democratic oversight (Geddes, 2003). This can cause security policies to be shaped by a narrow circle and the social support for them to remain weak. Russia's intervention in Ukraine, for example, was carried out as a result of decisions taken by a narrow circle without passing through a process of democratic deliberation and oversight, which led to international reactions and sanctions (Hill & Gaddy, 2015). In their study examining Russia's security policy decision-making processes, Hill and Gaddy (2015) set out that the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms paved the way for security decisions to be shaped by a narrow circle and for strategic miscalculations, and that the Ukraine intervention is a concrete manifestation of this structural problem.

The changes in Türkiye's security policies also demonstrate the importance of the separation of powers (Karaosmanoğlu, 2020). Particularly with regard to cross-border operations and military interventions, the weakening of parliamentary oversight led to these decisions being taken in a more centralized manner, which created certain problems with regard to international legitimacy and support (İşeri & Dilek, 2019). With the transition from the parliamentary system to the Presidential Government System, the oversight capacity of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye over security policies decreased; while this enables security decisions to be taken more rapidly, it can create difficulties with regard to democratic legitimacy and international support (Duran, 2018). In his study examining the transformation of civil-military relations in Türkiye, Karaosmanoğlu (2015) emphasized that the weakening of parliamentary oversight erodes the social legitimacy of security policies, and that this negatively affects international support and cooperation processes, particularly in cross-border operations.

In countries with a strong separation of powers, more peaceful and diplomatic means are preferred in resolving international conflicts. Democratic peace theory holds that the probability of democratic countries going to war with one another is lower and explains this through the conflict-limiting effect of democratic institutions and the separation of powers (Doyle, 1986). In their quantitative analyses testing the democratic peace hypothesis, Maoz and Russett (1993) showed that institutional constraints grounded in the separation of powers are as decisive as normative factors in lowering the probability of interstate conflict; this finding constitutes a fundamental reference point for understanding the structural contribution of the separation of powers to international peace. The research findings show that democratic countries make greater use of dialogue, negotiation, and international legal mechanisms to resolve international disputes (Russett & Oneal, 2001). In their comprehensive study *Triangulating Peace*, Russett and Oneal (2001) showed with empirical evidence that democracy, economic interdependence, and

membership in international organizations together form a "Kantian triangle" that supports peace, and set out that the functionality of this triangle depends on the sound functioning of democratic institutions and separation-of-powers mechanisms.

The separation of powers in internal political structures also shapes external political behavior (Putnam, 1988). The oversight of legislatures and public opinion makes it more difficult for the executive to pursue conflictual policies and ensures that greater weight is given to diplomatic solutions. Assessed within the framework of Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory, the fact that in countries with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms the executive must satisfy both the approval of parliament in domestic politics and the expectations of negotiating partners at the international level encourages peaceful solutions at the structural level by increasing the cost of conflictual policies. This once again emphasizes the importance of the separation of powers in foreign policy. In his study examining the socio-psychological dimensions of international conflicts, Kelman (2007) emphasized that, in democratic systems, separation-of-powers mechanisms facilitate trust-building between parties to a conflict and contribute to the institutionalization of peace processes; this observation supports, at the normative level, the constructive role of the separation of powers in conflict resolution.

In countries where the separation of powers has weakened or is absent, on the other hand, foreign policy decisions are generally taken by a narrow elite group, which increases the risk of inconsistency and unpredictability (Diamond, 2015). In authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, and Venezuela, the personalization of foreign policy and its being kept away from democratic oversight can pave the way for problems of trust in international relations and for diplomatic conflicts (Ambrosio, 2014). In his study examining the foreign policy behavior of authoritarian regimes, Ambrosio (2014) showed with empirical examples that the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms in these regimes leads to personalization in foreign policy and to strategic preferences detached from public opinion, and that this deepens the atmosphere of distrust in the international system and complicates conflict resolution processes. These findings show that the separation of powers is not merely a matter of domestic politics but also a critical factor in terms of international relations and global governance (Hakyemez, 2019). In his study examining the separation of powers under the Presidential System, Hakyemez (2019) emphasized that the functionality of the separation of powers in domestic politics is directly reflected in foreign policy processes, and that the weakening of this principle increases the risk of instability at both the national and international levels.

In conclusion, the findings obtained in this section set out how critical an element the separation of powers is in terms of international relations. The strengthening of democratic institutions and separation-of-powers mechanisms can increase states' position and credibility in the international system, strengthen their adherence to the international rules-based order, and develop their capacity to produce more effective solutions to global problems (Keyman, 2018). In his study examining the connection between democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law, Keyman (2018) set out that these three elements form a structural whole that complements and reinforces one another, and that the weakening of any one negatively affects the others, creating a domino effect in both domestic and foreign policy. In this context, the preservation and strengthening of the separation of powers is of great importance for ensuring peace, stability, and cooperation at both the national and international levels.

The separation of powers is also of critical importance in terms of the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance mechanisms. Countries with strong democratic institutions and a strong separation of powers take a more active role in producing solutions to global problems and contribute more substantially to multilateral cooperation mechanisms (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). Within the framework of the theory of interdependence, Keohane and Nye (2001) emphasized that, with the deepening of globalization, states' internal governance structures directly determine their levels of participation in global governance mechanisms, and that democratic states possessing a separation of powers exhibit systematically higher compliance with multilateral cooperation processes. In global problems such as climate change, pandemic management, and sustainable development examined within the scope of the research, it was observed that democratic countries pursue more constructive policies and are more open to international cooperation (Sachs, 2016). In his study examining the complex governance and new interdependence approach, Kahler (2016) set out that the necessity of international cooperation in resolving transboundary problems such as climate change, migration, terrorism, and pandemics brings the foreign policy dimension of democratic accountability mechanisms and of the separation of powers further to the fore.

The role of democratic countries within the United Nations (UN) system demonstrates the contribution of the separation of powers to global governance. The participation and financial contribution of democratic countries in the UN's principal organs and special programs increases the effectiveness of global governance and contributes to the diffusion of democratic values (Hurd, 2016). In his study examining the foundations of legitimacy of

international organizations, Hurd (2016) found that the active participation of democratic countries within the UN system strengthens this organization's normative legitimacy, and that states possessing a separation of powers display a more constructive and conciliatory attitude in international decision-making processes. Particularly in institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Development Programme, the leadership role of democratic countries helps to raise global standards and strengthen democratic values. In his study examining the UN Development Programme's democratic governance projects, Kara (2019) set out that these projects support institutional reform processes aimed at strengthening the separation of powers, and that the national-level adoption of democratic governance standards increases the effectiveness of global governance mechanisms.

The effect of the separation of powers is also evident in global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The support of these institutions by democratic countries and the taking into account of these countries' demands for institutional reform contribute to making global economic governance more transparent and accountable (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). The reforms made in these institutions in recent years aim to increase the representational power of developing countries and to make decision-making processes more democratic (Kaya, 2020). In his study examining the reform debates in global financial institutions, Kaya (2020) found that the democratization of these institutions' decision-making processes increases the effectiveness of countries possessing a separation of powers in global economic governance, and that the greater inclusion of developing countries in these processes contributes to global economic stability.

The role of civil society and international civil society organizations (CSOs) in global governance is also closely related to the separation of powers. In democratic systems, the strength of civil society ensures these countries' more active participation in global governance processes through international CSOs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In their classic study examining transnational advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink (1998) showed that, in democratic countries possessing a separation of powers, civil society serves a critical mediating function by creating a "boomerang effect" in the national-level adoption of international norms, and that this process directly increases the effectiveness of global governance mechanisms. The activities of CSOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Greenpeace contribute to the raising of global standards and to increasing states' accountability (Çelik, 2020). This allows the separation of powers to function as a kind of balance and oversight mechanism at the global level as well. Diamond (1994) emphasized that civil society and an independent media complement the separation-of-powers mechanism as a "fourth power," setting out that in countries with a strong civil society participation in global governance processes is more effective and sustainable, and that this directly affects the level of implementation of international norms.

The importance of the separation of powers emerged once again in global health crises, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic (Greer et al., 2020). In democratic countries, the autonomy of scientific institutions, legislative oversight, and judicial independence contributed to the development of more balanced and effective policies during the pandemic management process. In their study comparatively examining COVID-19 pandemic management, Toshkov et al. (2021) showed with empirical evidence that in democratic countries with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms, pandemic response policies rested more heavily on scientific evidence, that legislative oversight served a critical function in preventing disproportionate restrictions, and that these countries were more open to international cooperation in pandemic management. The principles of transparency and accountability increased the informing of public opinion and the legitimacy of policies, which positively affected the effectiveness of crisis management (Toshkov et al., 2021).

In authoritarian regimes, by contrast, the approach to global problems is generally more centralized and less transparent, which can make international cooperation difficult (Brownlee, 2007). It is observed that authoritarian countries experience more problems, particularly in matters of information-sharing and transparency, and that this makes the management of global crises difficult. In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, China's lack of transparency in information-sharing negatively affected the global preparedness process, which contributed to the more rapid spread of the pandemic (Kavanagh, 2020). In his study examining the role of transparency and accountability in pandemics, Kavanagh (2020) set out that the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms, by impeding the flow of information, seriously weakens the effectiveness of crisis response at both the national and international levels, whereas democratic oversight mechanisms, by safeguarding transparency, contribute to the more effective management of global health crises.

Türkiye's approach to global problems is also affected by the state of the separation of powers (Keyman, 2020). Particularly in matters such as climate change, migration, and the struggle against terrorism, the greater participation and transparency of policy-making processes may contribute to the development of more effective and sustainable solutions. In his study examining the relationship between global politics, COVID-19, and Türkiye, Keyman (2020) emphasized that Türkiye's capacity to respond effectively to global crises depends

largely on the democratic character of its internal institutional structures and the functionality of its separation-of-powers mechanisms, and that the centralization of decision-making processes leads to a loss of flexibility in the approach to global problems. The greater participation of civil society, academic institutions, and the legislature in these processes may strengthen Türkiye's approach to global problems and increase its capacity for international cooperation (Öniş & Kutlay, 2019). In their study examining Türkiye's capacity for international cooperation, Öniş and Kutlay (2019) set out that the strengthening of the separation of powers and the adoption of pluralistic policy-making processes would increase Türkiye's capacity to produce more comprehensive and sustainable solutions to global problems, and that this would reinforce Türkiye's effectiveness and standing in the international arena.

The findings addressed in this section set out that the separation of powers is a critical factor not only in domestic politics but also in international relations. The greater compliance of democratic governments with international law, their strengthening of cooperation with international organizations, and their pursuit of more stable policies in crisis management emphasize the importance of the separation-of-powers mechanism in foreign policy (Donnelly, 2013). In his study addressing the relationship between human rights and international politics in a multidimensional manner, Donnelly (2013) supported with comprehensive data that the separation of powers is a structural variable determining states' compliance with international norms, their diplomatic credibility, and their participation in global governance processes. These findings show how important the preservation of democratic institutions and values is for the creation of an atmosphere of stability and trust not only in domestic politics but also in international relations. Taking into account the trend of authoritarian rise and democratic backsliding documented in the Freedom House (2023) global freedom reports, it is clearly evident that these findings correspond to a current need both academically and politically.

The theoretical contribution of the study is its comprehensive treatment of the role of the separation of powers in international relations in its different dimensions. The combined evaluation of institutionalist, liberal, and realist perspectives made it possible to understand the topic in a multidimensional manner (Lake, 2021). In his study examining the connection between the state and international relations, Lake (2021) emphasized that states' internal institutional structures—particularly separation-of-powers mechanisms—directly shape their behavior in the international system, and that domestic and foreign policy analyses should therefore be addressed from an integrated perspective. The analysis, in particular, of how democratic institutions and the separation of powers shape states' foreign policy behavior and affect their position in the international system makes important contributions to the literature. This multidimensional analytical framework made it possible to evaluate the role of the separation of powers across a broad theoretical spectrum, from Waltz's (1979) structural realism perspective to Keohane's (1984) liberal institutionalist approach, and from Doyle's (1986) democratic peace theory to Wendt's (1999) constructivist international relations theory.

From an empirical standpoint, the study's findings show that countries with a strong separation of powers are more stable, reliable, and cooperative actors in international relations (Martin, A., 2020). The greater compliance of these countries with international law, their more effective cooperation with international organizations, and their more active role in resolving global problems set out the positive effects of the separation of powers in international relations. These empirical findings are also consistent with the studies of Simmons (2009) on the domestic incorporation of international human rights norms, Hillebrecht (2014) on compliance with international judicial rulings, and Büthe and Milner (2008) on the implementation of international economic agreements, confirming that the separation of powers creates a systematic positive effect across the different dimensions of international relations. These findings show that the strengthening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers will contribute to international peace and cooperation.

From the standpoint of policymakers, the study's findings show that the preservation and strengthening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers will provide important advantages not only in domestic politics but also in the international arena (Diamond, 2019). In his study examining democratic backsliding processes, Diamond (2019) emphasized that the weakening of separation-of-powers mechanisms leads not only to problems of internal governance but also to the erosion of states' international credibility, to diplomatic isolation, and to their exclusion from global governance processes, and that the preservation of the separation of powers should therefore be a strategic priority at both the national and international levels. Particularly in matters such as compliance with international law, diplomatic credibility, economic development, and the production of joint solutions to global problems, the strengthening of the separation of powers can yield important gains. In this context, the preservation of democratic values and institutions is of critical importance in terms of protecting national interests and increasing effectiveness in international relations.

In conclusion, the strengthening of the separation of powers enables states to conduct more effective and reliable policies on a global scale (Donnelly, 2013). For this reason, future studies' more in-depth examination of the connection between the separation of powers and international governance mechanisms will allow sounder analyses to be conducted in this area. In this context, the synthesis of Risse-Kappen's (1995) transgovernmental relations approach with Keohane and Nye's (2001) theory of interdependence will make it possible to evaluate the contribution of the separation of powers to global governance and international cooperation mechanisms from a more holistic perspective. The new dimensions of the separation of powers in the digital age in particular, the democratization of global governance structures, and the strengthening of international cooperation mechanisms stand out as important areas for future research. Moreover, examining how next-generation global problems such as artificial intelligence governance, cybersecurity, and digital surveillance are to be addressed within the framework of the separation of powers carries the potential to make important contributions at both the theoretical and applied levels.

6. DISCUSSION

The separation of powers is regarded as one of the most important elements for the sustainability of democratic governments. Ensuring the balance of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is aimed at limiting state authority and protecting individual rights and freedoms (Montesquieu, 1748). In this context, Vile (1998) emphasized that the doctrine of the separation of powers is not merely a technique of governance but also a philosophical principle constituting the normative foundation of constitutional democracy, setting out in an analytical framework the organic connection between the limitation of state power and the safeguarding of individual freedoms. With historical roots reaching back to Ancient Greece, this concept acquired a systematic framework largely through the work of the Enlightenment thinker Montesquieu and came to constitute the foundation of modern democratic structures (Özbudun, 2018). In assessing the constitutional transformation process in Türkiye, Özbudun (2018) argued that the Presidential Government System deviates from the classical separation-of-powers model and that the increase in the executive's influence over the legislature and the judiciary has weakened the functionality of democratic balance and oversight mechanisms. In systems grounded in the separation of powers, the fact that no state organ possesses absolute power is seen as an indispensable element for the sustainability of democratic governance (Erdoğan, 2020). Indeed, Ackerman (2000), moving beyond the classical tripartite model of the separation of powers, argued that "new powers" such as independent regulatory agencies, ombudsman mechanisms, and constitutional courts have emerged in modern democratic systems, maintaining that this pluralistic institutional structure renders balance and oversight mechanisms more complex but more effective.

In systems where the separation of powers is absent or dysfunctional, it is observed that the executive, by acquiring excessive power over the other branches, gives rise to authoritarian tendencies (Dahl, 1989). Bermeo (2016) set out that democratic backsliding today occurs no longer through classical military coups but through a process termed "executive aggrandizement," in which separation-of-powers mechanisms are eroded under a legal guise; this observation emphasizes the current urgency of preserving the separation of powers. The research findings show that, particularly in countries that have experienced democratic backsliding worldwide in recent years, the weakening of the separation of powers has accelerated this process (Freedom House, 2023). According to Freedom House (2023) data, in countries where the trend of democratic backsliding has accelerated globally and where separation-of-powers mechanisms have been weakened, both domestic instability and foreign policy unpredictability have increased; this clearly demonstrates the academic and political topicality of the subject. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for example, the executive's interference with judicial independence and the weakening of the legislature's oversight function have caused the erosion of democratic institutions (Pech & Scheppele, 2017). Examining in detail the processes of constitutional backsliding in Hungary and Poland, Pech and Scheppele (2017) set out that the executive's gradual establishment of control over the judiciary in these countries—changing judicial appointment processes, limiting the powers of constitutional courts, and weakening judicial oversight mechanisms—shook the foundations of the EU's rules-based order. This both led to the weakening of democratic values in domestic politics and negatively affected these countries' international relations. Scheppele (2018) explains this process through the concept of "autocratic legalism," arguing that the executive's use of legal instruments to render the separation of powers effectively inoperative constitutes one of the most widespread forms of democratic backsliding today.

The balance of powers plays a critical role in foreign policy as much as in domestic politics (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Assessed within the framework of Putnam's (1988) two-level game model, the institutional balancing mechanisms of domestic politics offer states both constraints and opportunities in international negotiation processes; this confirms that the separation of powers is a variable directly shaping the interaction between domestic and foreign policy. Legislative and judicial oversight of the executive makes possible a more comprehensive assessment of foreign policy decisions and the formulation of long-term strategies (Gözler, 2017).

This oversight, by preventing the executive from taking hasty and risk-laden decisions, increases stability and credibility in international relations. Fearon (1994) explained this mechanism through the concept of "audience costs" and showed that the domestic political costs faced by democratic leaders should they renege on their international commitments make the separation-of-powers system a structural element that enhances credibility in foreign policy. Foreign policy decisions subject to the approval of the legislature play a critical role in ensuring long-term stability while also contributing to the building of interstate trust (Rodrik, 2011).

Particularly in democratic systems, the powers of legislatures to approve foreign policy decisions and to oversee the budget limit the executive's room for maneuver and ensure the formulation of more balanced policies (Lindsay, 1994). In their study examining the effect of parliaments on foreign policy, Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) set out that the legislature's power of approval, by limiting the executive's room for maneuver, contributes to the production of a more accountable and predictable foreign policy. In the United States, for example, Congress's powers to declare war, to ratify international agreements, and to control foreign aid budgets limit the president's room for maneuver in foreign policy and make it imperative for foreign policy decisions to be taken with broader consensus (Hamilton et al., 2009). As Neustadt (1990) emphasized, in the U.S. presidential system power requires an ongoing process of negotiation over shared authorities; this likewise makes a continuous search for balance between the executive and the legislature imperative in the making of foreign policy decisions. Similarly, in Germany, the strong role of the Federal Parliament (the Bundestag) in matters of foreign and defense policy makes it imperative for the government's decisions in these areas to pass through parliamentary processes (Born, 2003). In his comparative study *Patterns of Democracy*, Lijphart (1999) showed that the separation of powers is applied more strictly in consensus democracies, whereas the executive-legislative relationship is more intertwined in majoritarian models; he nevertheless demonstrated that democratic accountability can be ensured through different mechanisms in both models.

The independence of judicial organs also constitutes an important dimension of the separation of powers. Independent courts, by reviewing the legal conformity of the actions of the executive and legislative organs, ensure the rule of law and the protection of individual rights (Dworkin, 1986). Tamanaha (2004) drew attention to two distinct interpretations of the concept of the rule of law—"thin" and "thick"—noting that the thin interpretation covers only procedural requirements, while the thick interpretation also encompasses substantive values such as human rights, democratic participation, and social justice; in both interpretations, the separation of powers is positioned as the principal institutional guarantee of the rule of law. This oversight also increases the state's compliance with international legal norms and commitments and reinforces credibility in international relations. For example, the rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Union define the legal framework of Germany's EU policies and ensure a balance between national sovereignty and European integration (Kommers & Miller, 2012). Slaughter (1995) set out that there is a direct positive correlation between democratic states' domestic legal structures and their levels of compliance with international law, emphasizing that separation-of-powers-based forms of government in particular provide an institutional infrastructure that facilitates the national-level implementation of international judicial rulings.

In states possessing a separation of powers, it is observed that the rate of compliance with international legal norms is higher. In democratic systems, the strength of judicial independence ensures the more effective integration of international legal rules into domestic legal systems (Fukuyama, 2014). In her comprehensive study examining mechanisms of compliance with international human rights law, Simmons (2009) showed that the levels of compliance with international norms of states possessing independent judicial organs and strong legislative oversight are significantly higher; this finding supports, at the empirical level, the view that separation-of-powers mechanisms are a structural factor determining the effectiveness of the international legal order. The research findings show that democratic countries are more willing to comply with international agreements and court rulings and integrate these commitments more successfully into their domestic legal systems (Simmons, 2009). This contributes to these countries' being accepted as more reliable actors in the international community. In his study examining the mechanisms by which international institutions encourage states to comply with international norms, Dai (2005) set out that the balance and oversight mechanisms in internal institutional structures—particularly an independent judiciary and legislative oversight—are the strongest guarantee in domestic law of compliance with international commitments.

In EU member states, for example, the strength of the separation-of-powers mechanism makes compliance with EU legal norms imperative and increases states' capacity to fulfill their obligations (Keohane, 2005). The rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union acquire direct applicability in member states' domestic legal systems, which increases the effectiveness of EU law (Weiler, 2000). Schimmelfennig (2007) showed that, in the European Union's enlargement process in Eastern Europe, the policy of democratic conditionality was a driving force in candidate countries' strengthening of their separation-of-powers mechanisms; this finding sets out the capacity of

international organizations to shape internal institutional structures. Similarly, the implementation of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also occurs at higher rates in democratic countries with strong judicial independence (Çalı et al., 2011). In his study examining the Southeast Türkiye cases before the European Court of Human Rights, Çalı (2010) emphasized that supranational human rights adjudication constitutes an indirect driving force in the strengthening of separation-of-powers mechanisms at the national level, and that judicial independence is the fundamental variable determining the effectiveness of this process.

By contrast, in countries where separation-of-powers mechanisms are weak, the arbitrary violation or non-implementation of international legal rules is a more widespread occurrence (Habermas, 1996). Because international law largely operates in dependence on states' domestic legal systems, the functionality of the separation of powers is a critical determinant of a state's legal credibility (Donnelly, 2013). Within the framework of the "spiral model" examining the process of the domestic internalization of international norms, Risse (2000) argued that separation-of-powers mechanisms—particularly an independent judiciary and civil society—function as a critical "domestic pressure mechanism" in embedding international human rights norms in state practice. In countries such as Russia and China, for example, the selective implementation or complete disregard of the rulings of international courts demonstrates the weakness of these countries' adherence to international law (Lo, 2015). In her study examining the limits of supranational adjudication in the Turkish context, Kurban (2020) showed that the effectiveness of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights depends largely on the addressed state's internal institutional structure—particularly the functionality of judicial independence and separation-of-powers mechanisms.

The relationship between international law and domestic law is directly affected by the effectiveness of the separation of powers (Slaughter & Burke-White, 2006). In democratic systems, the processes of ratifying and implementing international agreements pass through the oversight of the legislative and judicial organs, which facilitates the integration of these agreements into domestic law (Çelikel & Erdem, 2017). For example, the implementation of human rights conventions is strengthened in democratic countries through the case law of independent courts, which contributes to the raising of human rights standards (Gemalmaz, 2011). In this framework, Slaughter (1995) emphasized that legal relations among liberal states operate more intensely and more effectively thanks to internal institutional structures grounded in the separation of powers; this argument, which forms the basis of "liberal international law theory," confirms that the separation of powers is a structural factor determining the effectiveness of the international legal order.

In the case of Türkiye, the matter of compliance with international law is closely related to the state of the separation of powers (Özkan, 2019). Article 90 of the Constitution ensures the direct applicability in domestic law of international agreements concerning human rights, but the effectiveness of this provision depends largely on judicial independence (Başlar, 2019). Analyzing the process of democratic backsliding in Türkiye, Esen and Gümüşçü (2016) emphasized that the executive's increasing dominance over the legislative and judicial branches in the 2010s seriously disrupted the balance of the separation of powers, and that this negatively affected both the country's internal democratic functioning and its credibility in international relations. In periods when judicial independence weakened, problems can be experienced in the implementation of international human rights standards, which can negatively affect Türkiye's image in the international arena (Çalı, 2018). Indeed, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) emphasized that democratic erosion is usually realized through the gradual weakening of separation-of-powers mechanisms by elected leaders, and that this process brings with it unpredictability in foreign policy and a loss of international trust; the case of Türkiye can be regarded as a current example that supports this theoretical proposition at the concrete level.

The separation of powers ensures that foreign policy processes are overseen by different institutional mechanisms rather than remaining dependent on the initiative of a single person. In systems where the legislature and the judiciary have the power to review foreign policy decisions, the state's credibility in the international arena increases (Rodrik, 2011). In their classic study applying the bureaucratic politics model to foreign policy analysis, Allison and Zelikow (1999) emphasized that the separation-of-powers system enables the production of more balanced foreign policy outputs through the competition and accommodation of different institutional actors, and that this pluralistic decision-making process serves a critical function, especially in times of crisis, in preventing unilateral and hasty decisions. The research findings show that the foreign policy decisions of democratic countries pass through more transparent and accountable processes, which increases credibility and predictability in the international arena (Kaarbo, 2015). Kaarbo (2015) emphasized the decisive effect of domestic political processes on foreign policy and showed that the legislature's power of foreign policy oversight directly increases countries' international credibility; this observation renders concrete the structural effect of separation-of-powers mechanisms on foreign policy outputs.

The assumption of an oversight role by parliaments, particularly in large-scale foreign policy decisions, requires governments to act with broader consensus and forestalls sudden policy changes (Mearsheimer, 2001). The participation of legislatures in foreign policy decisions ensures that these decisions receive broader support in domestic politics, which increases the sustainability of foreign policy (Martin, 2000). Ripsman (2009) argued that domestic political institutions and decision-making processes function as intervening variables shaping how systemic pressures are translated into foreign policy, showing from a neoclassical realist perspective that separation-of-powers mechanisms directly affect the quality of states' responses to pressures coming from the international system. In the United States, for example, the Senate's power to ratify international agreements ensures that these agreements are deliberated more comprehensively and that potential problems are identified in advance (Lindsay, 1994).

In parliamentary systems, the government's responsibility to the legislature ensures that foreign policy decisions are taken on a broader basis of representation (Sartori, 1997). In parliamentary democracies such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, the shaping of foreign policy decisions as a result of parliamentary deliberation increases the democratic legitimacy of these decisions and reinforces stability in international relations (Oppermann & Brummer, 2014). In their study examining Türkiye's foreign policy transformation in the 2010s, Öniş and Kutlay (2017) set out that, with the strengthening of the executive, the foreign policy oversight capacity of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye weakened and foreign policy assumed an increasingly personalized structure; this concretely demonstrates, through a specific example, the negative effect of the erosion of the separation of powers on foreign policy consistency. In these countries, changes of government do not lead to radical transformations in foreign policy, which increases credibility and predictability in international relations. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) show that, especially in countries undergoing democratic transition, the fact that institutional balances have not yet settled can increase the risk of aggressiveness in foreign policy, thereby empirically supporting the decisive role of separation-of-powers mechanisms in foreign policy stability.

In presidential systems, for their part, the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive creates a balance and oversight mechanism in foreign policy (Neustadt, 1990). In the case of the United States, the president's broad powers in the field of foreign policy are balanced by Congress's powers of the budget, ratification, and oversight, which ensures that foreign policy decisions pass through a more comprehensive assessment (Hamilton et al., 2009). This balance contributes to the long-term stability of U.S. foreign policy and makes sudden policy changes difficult. Assessed within the framework of Putnam's (1988) two-level game model, the fact that in countries with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms the executive must satisfy both the approval of parliament in domestic politics and the expectations of negotiating partners at the international level encourages peaceful solutions at the structural level by increasing the cost of conflictual policies.

In systems where the separation of powers is weak, by contrast, foreign policy decisions are generally taken by a narrow circle of elites and remain away from democratic oversight (Way, 2015). This can lead to the personalization of foreign policy and its becoming unpredictable. In his study examining the foreign policy decision-making processes of authoritarian regimes, Geddes (2003) showed with empirical evidence that the taking of foreign policy decisions by a narrow elite group in these regimes leads to strategic inconsistencies and sudden policy changes owing to the absence of mechanisms of accountability to public opinion. In Russia, for example, the taking of foreign policy decisions by a narrow circle in the era of Vladimir Putin decreases the accountability of these decisions to public opinion and can lead to the inconsistency of policies (Lo, 2015). In their study examining Russia's security policy decision-making processes, Hill and Gaddy (2015) set out that the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms paved the way for security decisions to be shaped by a narrow circle and for strategic miscalculations, and that the Ukraine intervention is a concrete manifestation of this structural problem.

The changes in Türkiye's foreign policy processes constitute an example demonstrating the importance of the separation of powers (Duran, 2018). With the transition from the parliamentary system to the Presidential Government System, legislative oversight of foreign policy decisions weakened, which led to foreign policy assuming a more centralized and personalized structure (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017). In his study examining the transformation of civil-military relations in Türkiye, Karaosmanoğlu (2015) emphasized that the weakening of parliamentary oversight erodes the social legitimacy of security policies, and that this negatively affects international support and cooperation processes, particularly in cross-border operations. This transformation can lead to certain inconsistencies and unpredictabilities in Türkiye's foreign policy, which can create credibility problems in international relations. Kalaycıoğlu (2018) argued that this transformation paved the way for the weakening of an institutional continuity in Türkiye's foreign policy independent of changes of government and for the basing of foreign policy decisions on shorter-term calculations; this structural transformation in Türkiye's

foreign policy constitutes an important example of how the weakening of the separation of powers can affect foreign policy processes.

Governance systems grounded in the separation of powers enable states to work more harmoniously with international organizations. Particularly in relations with institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court, and NATO, it is observed that democratic states' capacities to fulfill their obligations are higher (Donnelly, 2003). In his study addressing the relationship between human rights and international politics in a multidimensional manner, Donnelly (2013) supported with comprehensive data that the separation of powers is a structural variable determining states' compliance with international norms, their diplomatic credibility, and their participation in global governance processes. The research findings show that democratic countries participate more actively in international organizations and are more effective in these organizations' decision-making processes (Tallberg et al., 2016). In their study comparatively examining the decision-making processes of international organizations, Tallberg et al. (2016) set out with empirical evidence that states with strong democratic institutions—particularly countries where separation-of-powers mechanisms function effectively—have a greater say in international organizations and play a more decisive role in shaping these organizations' normative agendas.

Because separation-of-powers-based governments are more accountable in the process of cooperation with these organizations, the rate at which commitments are fulfilled is higher (Habermas, 1996). The willingness of democratic countries to comply with international norms and decisions increases the effectiveness of international organizations and strengthens global governance (Keohane, 2005). Within the framework of the concept of interdependence, Keohane and Nye (2001) argued that democratic institutions and separation-of-powers mechanisms are a fundamental condition for the deepening and sustainability of international cooperation processes; this perspective grounds, at the conceptual level, the organic connection between democratic governance and multilateral diplomacy. For example, the functioning of the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism depends largely on member states' willingness to implement rulings, and democratic countries exhibit higher compliance in this regard (Shaffer, 2019). In their study examining the role of international lawyers, Werner et al. (2017) set out that in states with a strong separation of powers, international law professionals and institutions function more effectively, and that this increases states' levels of participation in international dispute settlement mechanisms and their rates of compliance with the rulings of these mechanisms.

The European Union actively supports the preservation of the separation of powers and the rule of law in member states (Kochenov, 2017). The EU can bring various sanction mechanisms into play in cases where judicial independence weakens and the separation of powers erodes in member states (Pech & Scheppele, 2017). Schimmelfennig (2007) showed that, in the European Union's enlargement process in Eastern Europe, the policy of democratic conditionality was a driving force in candidate countries' strengthening of their separation-of-powers mechanisms; this finding sets out the capacity of international organizations to shape internal institutional structures. In Poland and Hungary, for example, interventions against judicial independence caused the EU to activate its rule-of-law mechanism, and budget cuts and other sanctions for these countries came onto the agenda (Kelemen, 2020). This demonstrates the importance of the separation of powers in relations with international organizations. Ginsburg and Huq (2018) argued that, in order to increase democratic resilience, separation-of-powers mechanisms should be designed to serve as "constitutional insurance," maintaining in particular that the safeguarding of judicial independence, the autonomy of electoral commissions, and media pluralism constitutes the most effective institutional shields against democratic erosion; this approach also serves as a guide for the institutional design of international organizations' democratic conditionality policies.

By contrast, the single-centered and non-transparent nature of foreign policy processes in authoritarian regimes makes international cooperation difficult and reduces these countries' credibility in the global arena (Fukuyama, 2014). Authoritarian countries generally regard international organizations' demands concerning democratic values and human rights as interference in their internal affairs, which makes cooperation processes difficult (Brownlee, 2007). In his study examining the foreign policy behavior of authoritarian regimes, Ambrosio (2014) showed with empirical examples that the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms in these regimes leads to personalization in foreign policy and to strategic preferences detached from public opinion, and that this deepens the atmosphere of distrust in the international system and complicates multilateral cooperation processes. Countries such as China and Russia, for example, show resistance to the oversight mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council, which makes the implementation of global human rights standards difficult (Lo, 2015). In his study analyzing authoritarian governance dynamics, Svoblik (2012) emphasized that the absence of internal oversight mechanisms in these regimes creates a lack of trust not only in domestic politics but also in international cooperation processes, since international partners are justifiably reluctant to trust the commitments of governments lacking accountability mechanisms.

The changes in Türkiye's relations with international organizations constitute another example demonstrating the importance of the separation of powers (Müftüler-Baç, 2016). In her study analyzing the relationship between democratic progress and backsliding in Türkiye's European Union policy, Müftüler-Baç (2023) set out that the deterioration in the balance of the separation of powers directly affected Türkiye's institutional relations with the EU and was a decisive factor in the accession process coming to a standstill. Particularly in relations with the EU, the deterioration of the balance of the separation of powers and the weakening of judicial independence in Türkiye contributed to the accession negotiations coming to a standstill (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). Similarly, in relations with the Council of Europe and other international organizations, the departure from democratic standards has given rise to criticism, which has affected Türkiye's position in the international arena (Öniş & Kutlay, 2019). Diamond (2019) emphasized that in the struggle against democratic backsliding, institutional reforms at the national level alone are not sufficient, and that international mechanisms of democratic solidarity—such as the collective application of pressure by democratic states against authoritarian tendencies, the strengthening of democratic conditionality mechanisms, and the provision of international support to civil society—are of vital importance; the case of Türkiye constitutes an important case with regard to the effectiveness and limitations of these international pressure mechanisms.

The separation of powers ensures states' more effective participation in global security policies. The activation of legislative and judicial mechanisms by democratic states in formulating their security policies contributes to the prevention of interstate conflicts (Keohane, 2005). In his study deepening the security dimension of democratic peace theory, Doyle (2005) argued that the passage of foreign policy decisions through various institutional filters in democratic systems helps to avoid extreme policies and to safeguard long-term national interests, and that separation-of-powers mechanisms constitute the fundamental component of this institutional filtering process. The research findings show that democratic countries adopt more cooperative and multilateral approaches in security matters, which makes positive contributions to global security (Russett & Oneal, 2001). In their comprehensive study *Triangulating Peace*, Russett and Oneal (2001) showed with empirical evidence that democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organizations together form a "Kantian triangle" that supports peace, and set out that the functionality of this triangle depends on the sound functioning of democratic institutions and separation-of-powers mechanisms.

Particularly in collective security agreements, countries possessing a separation of powers are more inclined to cooperate. The security cooperation established within the framework of the Council of Europe and NATO, for example, is supported by separation-of-powers-based governments and ensures the formation of long-term alliances (Rodrik, 2011). NATO's (2022) Strategic Concept positions commitment to democratic values among the alliance's fundamental principles; this confirms at the institutional level that states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms are accepted as more reliable partners in collective security structures. NATO's principle of commitment to democratic values is regarded as one of the alliance's fundamental principles, and member countries are expected to preserve their democratic institutions and the separation of powers (Aydın, 2020).

In the security policies of democratic countries, parliamentary oversight and transparency ensure a more comprehensive assessment of decision-making processes (Kaarbo, 2018). In her study comparatively examining foreign policy decision-making processes, Kaarbo (2015) showed that coalition governments and multiparty parliamentary systems tend to adopt more cautious and multilateral approaches in foreign policy; this finding renders concrete the balancing effect of separation-of-powers mechanisms on security policy outputs. Particularly in critical matters such as military intervention and defense expenditures, the obtaining of parliamentary approval ensures that these decisions receive broader support in domestic politics and gain greater international legitimacy (Born, 2003). In Western European countries, for example, the subjection of military intervention decisions to parliamentary approval allows these decisions to be assessed more carefully and potential risks to be better analyzed. In their quantitative analyses testing the democratic peace hypothesis, Maoz and Russett (1993) showed that institutional constraints grounded in the separation of powers are as decisive as normative factors in lowering the probability of interstate conflict; this finding constitutes a fundamental reference point for understanding the structural function of the separation of powers in security policies.

In systems where the separation of powers is weak, on the other hand, security policies are generally determined behind closed doors and away from democratic oversight (Geddes, 2003). This can cause security policies to be shaped by a narrow circle and the social support for them to remain weak. Russia's intervention in Ukraine, for example, was carried out as a result of decisions taken by a narrow circle without passing through a process of democratic deliberation and oversight, which led to international reactions and sanctions (Hill & Gaddy, 2015). In their study examining Russia's security policy decision-making processes, Hill and Gaddy (2015) set out that the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms paved the way for security decisions to be shaped by a narrow

circle and for strategic miscalculations, and that the Ukraine intervention is a concrete manifestation of this structural problem.

The changes in Türkiye's security policies also demonstrate the importance of the separation of powers (Karaosmanoğlu, 2020). Particularly with regard to cross-border operations and military interventions, the weakening of parliamentary oversight led to these decisions being taken in a more centralized manner, which created certain problems with regard to international legitimacy and support (İşeri & Dilek, 2019). In his study examining the transformation of civil-military relations in Türkiye, Karaosmanoğlu (2015) emphasized that the weakening of parliamentary oversight erodes the social legitimacy of security policies, and that this negatively affects international support and cooperation processes, particularly in cross-border operations. With the transition from the parliamentary system to the Presidential Government System, the oversight capacity of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye over security policies decreased; while this enables security decisions to be taken more rapidly, it can create difficulties with regard to democratic legitimacy and international support (Duran, 2018). In this context, in his study examining the separation of powers under the Presidential System, Hakyemez (2019) emphasized that the executive's increasing dominance over security policies in the new system has weakened the functionality of democratic oversight mechanisms, and that this has given rise to legitimacy debates at both the national and international levels.

In countries with a strong separation of powers, more peaceful and diplomatic means are preferred in resolving international conflicts. Democratic peace theory holds that the probability of democratic countries going to war with one another is lower and explains this through the conflict-limiting effect of democratic institutions and the separation of powers (Doyle, 1986). In their quantitative analyses testing the democratic peace hypothesis, Maoz and Russett (1993) showed that institutional constraints grounded in the separation of powers are as decisive as normative factors in lowering the probability of interstate conflict; this finding constitutes a fundamental reference point for understanding the structural contribution of the separation of powers to international peace. The research findings show that democratic countries make greater use of dialogue, negotiation, and international legal mechanisms to resolve international disputes (Russett & Oneal, 2001).

The separation of powers in internal political structures also shapes external political behavior (Putnam, 1988). The oversight of legislatures and public opinion makes it more difficult for the executive to pursue conflictual policies and ensures that greater weight is given to diplomatic solutions. Assessed within the framework of Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory, the fact that in countries with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms the executive must satisfy both the approval of parliament in domestic politics and the expectations of negotiating partners at the international level encourages peaceful solutions at the structural level by increasing the cost of conflictual policies. In democratic countries, for example, the subjection of decisions for war to parliamentary approval leads to these decisions being assessed more carefully and to alternative means of resolution being investigated more comprehensively (Owen, 1994). In his study examining the socio-psychological dimensions of international conflicts, Kelman (2007) emphasized that, in democratic systems, separation-of-powers mechanisms facilitate trust-building between parties to a conflict and contribute to the institutionalization of peace processes; this observation supports, at the normative level, the constructive role of the separation of powers in conflict resolution.

In resolving international disputes, democratic countries more frequently prefer legal mechanisms and multilateral diplomacy (Slaughter, 2004). These countries resort more frequently to the International Court of Justice, arbitration tribunals, and other dispute settlement mechanisms, which increases the effectiveness of international law (Toluner, 2017). Simmons (2009) set out that states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms resort more frequently to international dispute settlement mechanisms and exhibit a higher rate of compliance with the rulings of these mechanisms; this finding once again confirms the structural importance of the separation of powers for the operability of the international legal order. Disputes among EU member states, for example, are generally resolved through EU institutions and legal mechanisms, which contributes to regional stability (Weiler, 2000).

In authoritarian regimes, by contrast, conflict resolution generally takes place through less transparent and less legal processes (Way, 2015). These countries may more frequently prefer power politics and unilateral actions in international disputes, which can increase the risk of conflict escalation. In his study examining the foreign policy behavior of authoritarian regimes, Ambrosio (2014) showed with empirical examples that the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms in these regimes leads to personalization in foreign policy and to strategic preferences detached from public opinion, and that this deepens the atmosphere of distrust in the international system and complicates conflict resolution processes. In the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, for example, China's rejection of international arbitration rulings and its carrying out of unilateral actions contributed to the increase of regional tensions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). This concretely demonstrates that, in countries

lacking separation-of-powers mechanisms, the binding force of international legal rulings is effectively weakened and conflict resolution processes are subordinated to power politics.

The separation of powers affects not only domestic politics and governance processes but also a country's international image and reputation. Countries with strong democratic institutions and a strong separation of powers have a more positive image in the international community, which provides an advantage in diplomatic relations (Nye, 2004). In developing the concept of soft power, Nye (2004) emphasized that a state's capacity to influence other countries through its values, institutions, and policies depends largely on the soundness of its internal institutional structure—particularly the separation of powers and democratic oversight mechanisms; this analytical framework explains, at the conceptual level, the indirect but powerful effect of the separation of powers on international relations. The research findings show that countries that have adopted democratic values receive greater sympathy and support in international public opinion (Anholt, A. S., 2022). As a result of the cross-national analysis they conducted within the framework of the World Bank Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al. (2011) set out that governance quality—particularly in the dimensions of government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption—is systematically higher in countries where separation-of-powers mechanisms function effectively; this high governance quality is directly reflected in the perception of international reputation and credibility.

Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power" refers to a country's capacity to influence other countries through its values, institutions, and policies, and the separation of powers constitutes an important component of this soft power (Nye, 2004). Democratic institutions and values increase a country's international attractiveness, which provides an advantage in diplomatic relations and international cooperation. The Scandinavian countries, for example, possess a high reputation in the international arena thanks to their strong democratic institutions and transparent governance structures, which increases these countries' diplomatic effectiveness (Ingebritsen, 2006). In his study examining the interaction between international norms and domestic politics, Risse-Kappen (1995) set out that the success of states with a strong separation of powers in complying with international norms ensures that these states are perceived as "legitimate" and "reliable" actors in the international community, and that this perception directly increases diplomatic bargaining power and effectiveness in multilateral negotiations.

In countries where the separation of powers has weakened, by contrast, the international image is generally negatively affected (Keyman, 2018). Developments such as the decrease in judicial independence, the restriction of media freedom, and the limitation of the rights of the opposition can give rise to criticism and a loss of image in the international community. In their comparative study of competitive authoritarian regimes, Levitsky and Way (2020) showed that, in countries where the separation of powers has been effectively eroded, the loss of international image does not remain merely a normative criticism but also leads to concrete diplomatic, economic, and security costs; international sanctions, capital flight, and diplomatic isolation stand out as the most evident manifestations of these costs. In Hungary and Poland, for example, the weakening of the separation of powers negatively affected these countries' positions within the EU and led to their facing various sanctions (Kelemen, 2020). Pech and Scheppele (2017) emphasized that the process of democratic backsliding in these countries threatens the EU's rules-based order as a whole, and that the activation of rule-of-law mechanisms is imperative not only for the relevant countries but also for the preservation of the EU's international reputation as a whole.

In the case of Türkiye as well, the state of democratic institutions and the separation of powers directly affects the country's international image (Öniş & Kutlay, 2019). Particularly in relations with the European Union, matters such as judicial independence and the rule of law constitute priority agenda items, and developments in these areas shape Türkiye's international position. In their study analyzing Türkiye's international image from the EU perspective, Aydın-Düzgüt and Tocci (2015) set out that the deterioration in the balance of the separation of powers seriously damaged Türkiye's perception as a "reliable democratic partner" and that this led to concrete losses in diplomatic relations. In recent years, the changes in the balance of the separation of powers have affected Türkiye's international image, which has caused certain difficulties in diplomatic relations and international cooperation (Aydın-Düzgüt & Tocci, 2015). Keyman (2018) analyzed that, specifically in the case of Türkiye, the weakening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers directly erodes the country's "soft power" capacity in international relations, and that this loss of capacity negatively affects Türkiye's diplomatic effectiveness at the regional and global levels.

The separation of powers also emerges as an important factor in terms of economic development and international investment. Countries with strong democratic institutions and a strong rule of law offer a more reliable and stable environment for foreign investors, which supports economic growth (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012). Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) showed, within a broad historical-comparative analysis, that the fundamental distinction between inclusive institutions and extractive institutions is directly related to whether the executive is effectively

limited, and demonstrated that in the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms economic institutions acquire an extractive character, which negatively affects countries' international economic integration. The research findings show that in countries with a strong separation of powers, property rights are better protected, contracts are enforced more effectively, and economic policies are more predictable (North, 1990). In his work *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, North (1990) argued that political systems grounded in the separation of powers lower transaction costs by providing the guarantee of property rights and make it easier for economic actors to make long-term investment decisions; this mechanism also ensures that states are perceived as reliable partners in international economic relations.

Foreign investors attach great importance, in particular, to judicial independence and the rule of law (Rodrik, 2007). Rodrik (2007) argued that democratic institutions function as a "commitment device" in economic policy, showing with empirical evidence that separation-of-powers mechanisms, by providing investors with assurance regarding policy stability, increase flows of foreign direct investment and facilitate international economic cooperation. The existence of independent courts gives investors confidence that their rights will be protected, which positively affects investment decisions. In the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index, for example, countries with a high level of rule of law and judicial independence generally rank higher, which increases these countries' capacity to attract foreign capital (Kaufmann et al., 2011). As a result of the cross-national analysis they conducted within the framework of the World Bank Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al. (2011) set out that governance quality—particularly in the dimensions of government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption—is systematically higher in countries where separation-of-powers mechanisms function effectively; this high governance quality exhibits a strong positive correlation directly with the capacity to attract foreign investment.

The stability and predictability of economic policies are also directly related to the separation of powers (Pamuk, 2018). The capacity of the legislature and independent oversight institutions to supervise economic policies makes it difficult to take arbitrary and populist economic decisions, which increases economic stability. In their study examining the relationship between participation in international trade agreements and internal institutional structures, Büthe and Milner (2008) found that states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms are integrated to a higher degree into international trade regimes, and that this integration is directly related to the credibility provided by internal institutional guarantees. Independent central banks, for example, contribute to economic stability by ensuring that monetary policies are protected from political interference (Blinder, 2018). In his study examining the functioning of the World Trade Organization dispute settlement mechanism, Shaffer (2019) found that democratic countries' willingness to comply with the rulings of this mechanism stems from the fact that their separation-of-powers-based institutional structures facilitate the implementation of international obligations in domestic law; this finding renders concrete the structural importance of the separation of powers for the functioning of the international economic order.

In systems where the separation of powers is weak, by contrast, economic policies are generally less transparent and less predictable, which poses a risk for investors (North, 1990). The increase in the executive's control over economic policies increases the risk of populist and short-term decisions being taken, which can lead to economic instability. The weakening of central bank independence, for example, can cause monetary policies to be shaped according to political interests and lead to economic imbalances (Blinder, 2018). In their study examining the vulnerabilities of the Turkish economy, Acemoğlu and Üçer (2021) set out that the centralization of economic decision-making processes and the weakening of independent institutional structures constitute one of the fundamental structural causes of macroeconomic instability and exchange rate volatility, and that this directly erodes Türkiye's credibility in international capital markets.

The developments in the Turkish economy constitute an example demonstrating the effect of the separation of powers on economic development (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017). In their study examining Türkiye's position as an emerging middle power in regional and global governance, Öniş and Kutlay (2017) found that the tendency toward centralization in economic decision-making processes and the decrease in the effectiveness of independent institutions negatively affected Türkiye's international economic credibility and its contribution to global economic governance. In particular, the centralization of economic decision-making processes and the decrease in the effectiveness of independent institutions in recent years have reduced the predictability of economic policies, which has negatively affected investor confidence. Debates concerning the independence of the Central Bank and the perception of interference in monetary policies have contributed to economic instability, which has led to the lowering of Türkiye's credit ratings and a decrease in its capacity to attract foreign capital (Pamuk, 2018). In his study examining Türkiye's economic history from a long-term perspective, Pamuk (2018) showed with historical data that in periods when separation-of-powers mechanisms were strengthened, economic growth was more stable and sustainable, whereas in periods when these mechanisms weakened, economic uncertainty

increased and international investor confidence was shaken; these findings support, at the empirical level, the structural importance of the separation of powers in terms of economic development and international economic integration.

The separation of powers also plays an important role in addressing global problems and producing solutions. The greater participation of democratic countries in multilateral cooperation mechanisms contributes to the production of more effective solutions to global problems (Keohane & Nye, 2001). In his study examining the complex governance and new interdependence approach, Kahler (2016) set out that the necessity of international cooperation in resolving transboundary problems such as climate change, migration, terrorism, and pandemics brings the foreign policy dimension of democratic accountability mechanisms and of the separation of powers further to the fore. The research findings show that countries with strong democratic institutions display a more cooperative attitude on transboundary problems such as climate change, global health crises, terrorism, and migration (Hale & Held, 2018). In their study examining the democratic deficit of global governance structures, Held and McGrew (2007) argued that the absence at the international level of an equivalent of the balance and oversight mechanisms grounded in the separation of powers at the national level is one of the fundamental causes of the legitimacy crisis of global institutions; this observation shows that the separation of powers constitutes a reference point not only at the national level but also at the level of global governance.

On climate change, democratic countries generally set more ambitious targets and exhibit greater adherence to international agreements (Shaffer, 2019). In the process of signing and implementing the Paris Climate Agreement, it is observed that democratic countries took a more active role and exhibited greater compliance with the agreement's provisions (Aydın, 2021). In these countries, the participation of civil society and scientific institutions in policy-making processes contributes to the development of more effective and comprehensive climate policies. In their study examining the bureaucratic structures of international organizations, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) set out that these organizations' development of oversight mechanisms resembling the separation of powers within themselves—such as independent evaluation units, internal oversight mechanisms, and ombudsman institutions—increases their institutional effectiveness and legitimacy; this finding demonstrates the applicability of the separation of powers as a model in international institutional design, including global environmental governance.

The importance of the separation of powers emerged once again in global health crises, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic (Greer et al., 2020). In democratic countries, the autonomy of scientific institutions, legislative oversight, and judicial independence contributed to the development of more balanced and effective policies during the pandemic management process. In his study examining the foundations of legitimacy of international organizations, Hurd (2016) found that democratic countries display a more constructive and conciliatory attitude in international decision-making processes, including global health governance, and that states possessing a separation of powers strengthen the normative legitimacy of these processes. The principles of transparency and accountability increased the informing of public opinion and the legitimacy of policies, which positively affected the effectiveness of crisis management (Toshkov et al., 2021). In their work *The Power of Human Rights*, Risse et al. (1999) explained, within the framework of the "spiral model," that transnational advocacy networks ensure the diffusion of human rights norms in repressive regimes and that this process ultimately contributes to the strengthening of separation-of-powers mechanisms; this mechanism serves a similar function in ensuring compliance with international norms in transboundary problems such as global health crises as well.

In authoritarian regimes, by contrast, the approach to global problems is generally more centralized and less transparent, which can make international cooperation difficult (Brownlee, 2007). It is observed that authoritarian countries experience more problems, particularly in matters of information-sharing and transparency, and that this makes the management of global crises difficult. In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, China's lack of transparency in information-sharing negatively affected the global preparedness process, which contributed to the more rapid spread of the pandemic (Kavanagh, 2020). This example concretely demonstrates that, in the absence of separation-of-powers mechanisms, the executive's tendency to control the flow of information can lead to serious consequences not only at the national level but also on a global scale; indeed, the restriction of the oversight function of independent scientific institutions and the media directly weakens the functionality of early warning mechanisms against transboundary problems.

Türkiye's approach to global problems is also affected by the state of the separation of powers (Keyman, 2020). In his study examining the UN Development Programme's democratic governance projects, Kara (2019) set out that these projects support institutional reform processes aimed at strengthening the separation of powers, and that the national-level adoption of democratic governance standards facilitates the production of more effective and

sustainable solutions to global problems; Türkiye's level of participation in these processes is directly related to the functionality of the separation of powers. Particularly in matters such as climate change, migration, and the struggle against terrorism, the greater participation and transparency of policy-making processes may contribute to the development of more effective and sustainable solutions. The greater participation of civil society, academic institutions, and the legislature in these processes may strengthen Türkiye's approach to global problems and increase its capacity for international cooperation (Öniş & Kutlay, 2019). In their pioneering study examining the role of international advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink (1998) set out that the strength of civil society in democratic systems enables these countries to develop more sensitive and more effective approaches to global problems, and that civil society's capacity to influence policy-making processes through separation-of-powers mechanisms directly increases their level of participation in global governance processes.

The findings addressed in this section set out that the separation of powers is a critical factor not only in domestic politics but also in international relations. The greater compliance of democratic governments with international law, their strengthening of cooperation with international organizations, and their pursuit of more stable policies in crisis management emphasize the importance of the separation-of-powers mechanism in foreign policy (Donnelly, 2013). In his study addressing the relationship between human rights and international politics in a multidimensional manner, Donnelly (2013) supported with comprehensive data that the separation of powers is a structural variable determining states' compliance with international norms, their diplomatic credibility, and their participation in global governance processes. These findings show how important the preservation of democratic institutions and values is for the creation of an atmosphere of stability and trust not only in domestic politics but also in international relations. Taking into account the trend of authoritarian rise and democratic backsliding documented in the Freedom House (2023) global freedom reports, it is clearly evident that these findings correspond to a current need both academically and politically.

The theoretical contribution of the study is its comprehensive treatment of the role of the separation of powers in international relations in its different dimensions. The combined evaluation of institutionalist, liberal, and realist perspectives made it possible to understand the topic in a multidimensional manner (Lake, 2021). In his study examining the connection between the state and international relations, Lake (2021) emphasized that states' internal institutional structures—particularly separation-of-powers mechanisms—directly shape their behavior in the international system, and that domestic and foreign policy analyses should therefore be addressed from an integrated perspective. The analysis, in particular, of how democratic institutions and the separation of powers shape states' foreign policy behavior and affect their position in the international system makes important contributions to the literature. This multidimensional analytical framework made it possible to evaluate the role of the separation of powers across a broad theoretical spectrum, from Waltz's (1979) structural realism perspective to Keohane's (1984) liberal institutionalist approach, and from Doyle's (1986) democratic peace theory to Wendt's (1999) constructivist international relations theory.

From an empirical standpoint, the study's findings show that countries with a strong separation of powers are more stable, reliable, and cooperative actors in international relations (Martin, A., 2020). The greater compliance of these countries with international law, their more effective cooperation with international organizations, and their more active role in resolving global problems set out the positive effects of the separation of powers in international relations. The empirical studies of Simmons (2009) on compliance with international human rights law, of Büthe and Milner (2008) on integration into international trade regimes, and of Russett and Oneal (2001) on international peace consistently show that states with strong separation-of-powers mechanisms perform systematically better in all three of these dimensions—compliance with law, economic integration, and peace. These findings show that the strengthening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers will contribute to international peace and cooperation.

From the standpoint of policymakers, the study's findings show that the preservation and strengthening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers will provide important advantages not only in domestic politics but also in the international arena (Diamond, 2019). In his work *Ill Winds*, Diamond (2019) argued that, under today's conditions in which the trend of democratic backsliding has accelerated globally, the preservation of democratic institutions and separation-of-powers mechanisms is not merely a normative choice but also a strategic necessity in terms of states' international effectiveness, security, and economic prosperity. Particularly in matters such as compliance with international law, diplomatic credibility, economic development, and the production of joint solutions to global problems, the strengthening of the separation of powers can yield important gains. In this context, the preservation of democratic values and institutions is of critical importance in terms of protecting national interests and increasing effectiveness in international relations. Ginsburg and Huq (2018) argued that, in order to increase democratic resilience, separation-of-powers mechanisms should be designed to

serve as "constitutional insurance"; this proposal offers a valid policy perspective not only for domestic political arrangements but also for strengthening states' positions in the international arena.

In conclusion, the strengthening of the separation of powers enables states to conduct more effective and reliable policies on a global scale (Donnelly, 2013). For this reason, future studies' more in-depth examination of the connection between the separation of powers and international governance mechanisms will allow sounder analyses to be conducted in this area. In their study examining the future of democratic governance, Gardels and Berggruen (2019) argued that the preservation of democratic values and the separation of powers at the global level will be possible not only through reforms at the national level but also through the strengthening of international mechanisms of democratic solidarity; this perspective offers an important roadmap for future research. The new dimensions of the separation of powers in the digital age in particular, the democratization of global governance structures, and the strengthening of international cooperation mechanisms stand out as important areas for future research. In this context, in her study examining the dialectic between democratic progress and backsliding in Türkiye's European Union policy, Müftüler-Baç (2023) emphasized that the strengthening of the separation of powers is of critical importance both for the sustainability of democratic institutions at the national level and for the preservation of peace, stability, and cooperation at the international level, proposing that future research should examine the effects of this principle in new areas such as digital transformation, artificial intelligence governance, and global climate policy.

7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has investigated how the separation of powers shapes not only states' internal functioning but also their foreign policy behavior and their position in the international arena. Systematized by Montesquieu (1748), this principle, by envisaging a balanced distribution of power among the legislative, executive, and judiciary, forestalls arbitrary governance and safeguards the rule of law. The comparative analysis conducted throughout the study has shown that the effect of this internal balance does not remain confined within national borders. Governments where the separation of powers operates robustly act more consistently and predictably in foreign policy and stand out as more reliable actors in the international arena. The fundamental conclusion that follows is clear: how credible a state's international commitments are depends largely on the strength of the institutions that oversee those commitments at home.

In the literature, the separation of powers has mostly been addressed as a matter of constitutional law or comparative politics, while international relations studies have generally assessed regime type through broad categories such as democracy and autocracy. The contribution of this study lies in directly linking the intervening institutional mechanism—that is, the balance among the powers—to international outcomes. Democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1986), liberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984), and structural realism (Waltz, 1979) have been brought together within a single framework; the effect of internal institutional structure on foreign policy has been read, as neoclassical realism (Ripsman, 2009) suggests, as a filter that translates pressures coming from the system into foreign policy decisions. In this way, domestic and foreign policy analyses, which are often conducted separately, have been brought together on a common ground, and the separation of powers has been positioned as a structural variable linking these two levels.

The mechanism behind the relationships set out by the study can be gathered into three points. First, the passage of foreign policy decisions through the approval of more than one institution makes these decisions difficult to reverse easily; this renders the promises given more binding and therefore more credible. Second, in systems with legislative oversight and a free press, rulers who go back on their word pay a price in domestic politics; this pressure to account increases the trust placed in the state's international promises. Third, open and reviewable decision-making processes make a state's intentions legible to other states; this reduces misunderstanding and security dilemmas. Together, these three mechanisms explain why the separation of powers is not merely a virtue of internal governance but also a source of foreign policy.

The most evident reflection of this mechanism is seen in the area of compliance with international law. In countries where the judiciary is independent, foreign policy decisions rest on a legal framework, and adherence to international agreements and compliance with the rulings of international courts are markedly strengthened. When independent courts provide oversight that operates internally against human rights violations, the state's compliance with international norms and its reputation in this area also increase. In governments where the judiciary has come under the influence of the executive, by contrast, the rulings of international courts are implemented selectively or disregarded; this sets out that the state's adherence to law is structurally weakened.

A similar divergence is also observed in relations with international organizations and in security policies. Governments grounded in the separation of powers assume more effective and constructive roles in international organizations and adapt more easily to multilateral processes. In times of crisis, legislative and public oversight makes it more difficult for the executive to take unilateral and hasty steps and opens space for diplomatic solutions. These constraints created by democratic institutions, by limiting aggressive and expansionist tendencies, lower the probability of conflict; and the subjection of security policies to parliamentary oversight reinforces both the internal legitimacy of these policies and their credibility in the eyes of allies. In this respect, the separation of powers functions as not only a normative but also an institutional foundation of international peace.

The effect of the principle extends to the economic and reputational spheres as well. Countries where independent courts exist and property rights are safeguarded offer a more predictable environment for foreign investors and participate more easily in international economic integration. Commitment to democratic values and the rule of law nourishes these states' international reputation and soft power capacity and enables them to make more constructive contributions to global governance processes. On transboundary problems such as climate change and pandemic management, transparency and accountability facilitate both the production of sound policies and openness to international cooperation.

The case of Türkiye offers a concrete illustration of this relationship. The centralization of foreign policy decision-making processes with the transition from the parliamentary system to the Presidential Government System led to the personalization of decisions and the weakening of institutional continuity. The coincidence of the periods in which judicial independence was eroded with the decline in compliance with international judicial rulings demonstrates that the change in the balance of the separation of powers directly affects credibility in foreign policy. This picture brings the headings of democratic standards and the rule of law to the fore, particularly in relations with the European Union. In hybrid systems such as Türkiye, the strengthening of institutional balance carries the quality of a lever that could positively transform the country's international position and diplomatic effectiveness.

The study has certain limitations. The research rests on qualitative analysis, document examination, and case studies conducted on a limited number of countries. For this reason, caution must be exercised in directly generalizing the findings to all forms of government. The connection between the separation of powers and foreign policy outputs is also not unidirectional; while strong institutions increase credibility, international pressure and obligations can also nourish the strengthening of internal institutions. Moreover, consistency in foreign policy cannot be explained by institutional balance alone; factors such as economic interdependence, alliance structures, and leadership are also part of the process. The difficulties in measuring concepts such as the strength of the separation of powers should also be kept in mind in interpreting the findings.

Proceeding from these findings, the study offers several recommendations at the policy level. The path to increasing states' international credibility lies not merely in foreign policy discourse but in strengthening the internal institutions that oversee foreign policy. Preserving judicial independence, keeping the legislature's power to oversee foreign policy and security decisions functional, and increasing transparency in decision-making processes reinforce a state's adherence to its commitments and the trust of its partners. The lesson to be drawn for international organizations and partner states is also clear: in assessing a country's credibility, the strength of the institutional oversight mechanisms that uphold those commitments must be taken into account as much as the commitments on paper. Although leaving foreign policy to the monopoly of a narrow cadre may bring speed in the short term, in the long term it damages predictability and standing. In countries undergoing transformation, such as Türkiye, the strengthening of balance and oversight mechanisms will provide a lasting gain in terms of both internal stability and international standing.

There are also fruitful directions for future research. Testing the connection between the separation of powers and international governance with quantitative data and broader country samples will place the relationships set out in this study on a sounder footing. Longitudinal designs that track how changes in a single country's institutional balance affect foreign policy outputs over time, in particular, may help to establish cause-and-effect relationships more strongly. How new problems such as artificial intelligence governance, cybersecurity, digital surveillance, and the oversight of algorithmic decision-making processes are to be addressed within the framework of this principle, meanwhile, constitutes an open research area from both a theoretical and an applied standpoint. Considered together, all of this shows that the separation of powers is not merely a part of the national constitutional order but a structural factor shaping states' international behavior, their credibility, and their contribution to global governance. A strong separation of powers is the guarantee of both freedom at home and trust abroad.

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